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The penetration of national airspace by a foreign state aircraft is a serious occurrence in the 
eyes of the offended party. The seriousness is enhanced when done at high speed and low 
altitude, signifying a higher threat level. In October 2003, two Russian fighter aircraft entered 
Estonian airspace in the vicinity of Hiiumaa island and continued their flight over two hundred 
kilometres inside the airspace. The act was thought to be an intel collection and testing flight 
for the new Kellavere radar post in the eastern part of Estonia. During the flight, the two 
fighters passed the seat of the Government of Estonia (the Stenbock House) by only 2 
kilometres as they overflew Tallinn.1 The event happened less than six months before Estonia 
became a member of NATO. Fortunately, as a blatant disregard for the sovereignty of the 
Estonian air border, this incident was a rare occurrence in its scale. Still, regular intrusion into 
Estonian airspace by foreign state aircraft has not met its end there. 
 
A State's airspace is defined as a pillar of air, which arises from the State. It is restricted to the 
State's boundary, including its territorial and inland waters, where it holds exclusive and 
complete authority. Estonian airspace is defined in the State Borders Act § 3 (3): "airspace 
above the territory, territorial waters and inland waters of Estonia and above the parts of 
transboundary water bodies which belong to Estonia."2 Therefore the Estonian air border is a 
continuous and closed imaginary line that matches the Estonian state border and the vertical 
section. Crossing the air border in this study is defined as crossing the state border excluding 
sea or land border. The latter can be done with any aircraft: fixed-wing or rotary-wing, human-
crewed or unmanned, etc. The definition of aircraft as an apparatus for navigating the airspace 
used in this thesis is its most commonly understandable form. 
 
State border and the adequate protection and defence of its boundary are primary 
characteristics of a sovereign State. Without the former, it is impossible to ensure the State's 
national security, perform customs checks and procedures, intercept illegal crossings of the 
state border, prevent smuggling of illicit goods, etc. State border is not a mandatory 
characteristic of a State but can be of high importance for recognising a territorial entity as a 
                                                 
1Kaas, K. Vene hävituslennukid tungisid Eesti taevasse. Postimees, 05.03.2004. - 
https://www.postimees.ee/1401871/vene-havituslennukid-tungisid-eesti-taevasse [06.01.2021]. 
2 Riigipiiri seadus (State Borders Act). Adopted 30.06.1994, e.i.f. 31.07.1994 (RT I, 08.07.2020, 7), § 3 (3). 
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State.3 The constitution of Estonia states that the Estonian air border shall be defined according 
to generally recognised international conventions. The primary source of international 
airspace law is the Convention of International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on the 7th 
December 1944 (The Chicago Convention)4, on which the Estonian airspace law is based.5 
Article 3 (a) of the Chicago Convention states that the Convention shall apply only to civil 
aircraft and shall not apply to state aircraft. 
 
The term "state aircraft" is ambiguous. The Chicago Convention art 3 (b) purports that an 
“aircraft used in military, customs, and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft”. 
This is, of course, a concise list of functions that a state aircraft can perform. Estonian Aviation 
Act § 5 (3)6 similarly defines state aircraft as aircraft used in Defence Forces, customs, or 
police services as state aircraft. Aircraft that do not qualify under those categories are deemed 
as civil aircraft.7 This concept is further expanded in the first chapter of this thesis. 
 
Illegal entry or illegal border crossing is commonly criminalised based on national security 
reasons, controlling illegal immigration etc. Whether it is a misdemeanour or a criminal 
offence, it is universally accepted that crossing a national border without authorisation is 
punishable by state law. Several criminal offences and misdemeanours relating to this matter 
can be found in the Penal Code of Estonia and other acts like the State Borders Act. 
 
Whereas every aircraft can violate national airspace, this thesis has its scope on state aircraft, 
whether they are of military origin or aircraft performing another state function. Civil aviation 
is probably one of the most regulated parts of international law, but most of these conventions 
or other treaties are not applicable to state aircraft. The scope of this thesis is further narrowed 
to include only time of peace, excluding aspects arising from international armed conflicts or 
factors of international humanitarian law. 
 
                                                 
3 Mälksoo, L. et al. PõhiS § 122. – Ü. Madise (ed). – Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. [The Constitution of the Republic 
of Estonia]. Commented Edition. 4. ed. Tallinn: Juura 2017, commentary no. 4. 
4 The Convention on International Civil Aviation. Chicago: 7.12.1944, e.i.f. 4.04.1947 
5 Mälksoo, L. et al. PõhiS § 122. – Ü. Madise (ed). – Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. [The Constitution of the Republic 
of Estonia]. Commented Edition. 4. ed. Tallinn: Juura 2017, commentary no. 5 
6 Lennundusseadus (Aviation Act). Adopted 17.02.1999, e.i.f. 01.09.1999 (RT I, 10.12.2020, 14). § 5 (3) 
7 Ibidem, § 5 (4) 
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According to the Estonian State Borders Act § 18 (1), the Defence Forces has the function of 
protecting and guarding the Estonian airspace. The Defence Forces are a militarily organised 
governmental authority within the government of the Ministry of Defence.8 The main 
functions of the Defence Forces are military defence of the State and participation in collective 
self-defence.9 These are commonly understandable functions when we think about military 
organisations as a whole. In times of war or conflict, the Defence Forces are the central 
authority to protect Estonia from foreign invaders. Safeguarding national airspace is a function 
that must be conducted whatever the situation may be, including time of peace. Therefore, the 
Defence Forces must constantly perform this function and have the right competencies. 
 
The main problem regarding airspace violations is that the perpetrators are not currently 
punished under Estonian law; therefore, it must be determined whether criminalising these 
incidents would be helpful in this regard.  
 
The primary purpose of this study is to find out on which grounds it is possible to criminalise 
territorial violations by foreign state aircraft in Estonian criminal law. The thesis shall also 
determine whether criminalisation would be an effective way to deter these violations and 
what purpose would it serve.  
 
The primary research questions are as follows. Which aircraft are state aircraft, and how is 
their entry into Estonian airspace regulated by national and international law? How is the 
safeguarding of Estonian airspace conducted by the Defence Forces? Which are the most 
common Estonian airspace violations? How are territorial violations by foreign state aircraft 
regulated in Finnish criminal law? What challenges would the criminalisation of airspace 
violations face concerning Estonian criminal law, and how would it affect the possibility of 
punishing the perpetrators? 
 
The analytical legal method is predominantly used in this study to interpret the current 
regulative framework concerning state aircraft and airspace violations. The analysis in the 
thesis is doctrinal; it connects international law principles regarding domains of the sea and 
                                                 
8 Kaitseväe korralduse seadus (Estonian Defence Forces Organisation Act). Adopted 19.06.2008, e.i.f. 
01.01.2009 (RT I, 26.05.2020, 9), § 2 (1). 
9 Ibidem, § 3 (1). 
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airspace with Estonian domestic regulations on national defence and criminal law. 
Furthermore, using the comparative method, the Finnish regulation on the criminalisation of 
territorial violations is compared to the current Estonian legislature, which interprets the 
essential part of the purpose and legal practice. 
 
The primary source used in this study is the Chicago Convention and other sources related to 
its interpretation. Additionally, numerous Estonian legal Acts are used to highlight the 
procedure behind airspace control and regulations. The primary source for known Estonian 
airspace violations is derived from publicly available newspapers and press releases. Finnish 
legal acts for criminal law are used in the third chapter, augmented by a comprehensive article 
on Finnish practice regarding territorial violations. 
 
Criminalising airspace violations in Estonian law is a novel concept. Still, a Master’s Thesis 
has been written regarding freedom of overflight, defining military aircraft, and transponders' 
use whilst traversing the EEZs over the Baltic Sea.10 Furthermore, a master's thesis was 
published regarding the risk behaviour of Russian Air Force aircraft in the Baltic Sea region.11 
 
To effectively analyse the problem, this thesis is divided into three separate parts. The first 
chapter focuses on the sovereignty of airspace in international law, defining state aircraft and 
their obligations for entering Estonian airspace. Furthermore, it dwells on the Estonian 
Defence Forces competencies for safeguarding the air border and airspace and the role of 
Baltic Air Policing in that function of the state. The second chapter is a case study of Estonian 
airspace violations by foreign state aircraft, focusing on the geographical area of Vaindloo 
island, where almost every air border violation in Estonia occurs. The third chapter analyses 
how and why territorial violations are regulated in Finnish criminal law and dwell on the 
possibility of criminalising the aforementioned acts in Estonian law: the modus operandi, 
desired effects, and challenges. 
 
I want to offer my sincerest thanks and appreciation to my wife Polina for the opportunity and 
all of the support she gave to me while writing this thesis. Additionally, I am grateful to my 
                                                 
10 Mae, M. The establishment of a potential treaty obligation for military aircraft to fly with activated transponders 
over the Baltic Sea. Tallinn: Master’s Thesis, University of Tartu 2018. 
11 Habakuk, M. Russian Air Force’s Risk Behaviour in the Baltic Sea Region. Tallinn: Master’s Thesis, Estonian 
Academy of Security Sciences 2017. 
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supervisor, Alexander Lott, who introduced me to this particular topic and gave thorough 
feedback on the primary challenges I faced whilst traversing in the airspace of this thesis. 
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1. COMPETENCIES OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES 
REGARDING THE SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL AIRSPACE 
 
 
1.1. The principle of a sovereign airspace  
 
1.1.1. Sovereignty against freedom of overflight 
 
The meaning of sovereignty is not universally defined in international law. Still, it is argued 
that the essential part of it is the State's supreme control over its internal affairs. No other State 
or international organisation may intervene in matters that fall within the domestic jurisdiction 
of a State. Of course, this supreme control can be hindered by recognised limitations imposed 
by international law.12 It is still argued that the principle of sovereignty is pivotal in modern 
international law and is most probably "the principle" on which most other institutions and 
principles of international law rely, directly or indirectly.13 
 
The sovereignty principle is one of the pillars of the Chicago Convention. It is stated in Article 
1 that “the contracting States recognise that every State has complete and exclusive 
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” The wording of this article points to States' 
authority over their airspace as absolute. Therefore, it is not a surprise that public international 
air law stands on two principles. Firstly, it is recognised that States have complete control over 
the air above their territory and territorial waters that include the right to impose their 
jurisdiction over such airspace. A State may require any foreign aircraft in its airspace to 
comply with its regulations on air transport, for example, concerning the aircraft and its crew, 
navigation, and environment. This right is limited by international treaty obligations the State 
has assumed in the interest of safe and efficient air transport.14  
 
                                                 
12 Franklin, M. Sovereignty and Functional Airspace Blocks. Air & Space Law 2007/32, No.6, p. 426 
13 Besson, S. Sovereignty. The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2012, p. 366  
14 Hailbronner, K. Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea. - The American Journal of 
International Law 1983/77, No.3, p. 490 
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States have specific attributes in their sovereign airspace according to the Chicago Convention 
that includes scheduled air services (Article 6), cabotage (Article 7) and pilotless aircraft 
(Article 8). The right to implement rules on air services is a provision that has had critical 
importance for international air transport and has been seen as an obstacle to the global 
liberalisation of air transport services.15  
 
There are very few judicial cases in the matter of sovereignty and the Chicago Convention. 
Still, in the case of R (on the application of Kibris Turk Hava Yollari & CTA Holiday) v. 
Secretary of State for Transport (Republic of Cyprus, interested party) [2010], it is argued that 
a contracting State of the Chicago Convention retains its rights derived from the Convention 
(regulation of air services into and out of all parts of their territory, including determination of 
airports where aircraft are permitted to land etc.) over the airspace of its territory even if part 
of their territory is under the effective control of a third party.16 The aforementioned case 
concerned the island of Cyprus and the permissibility of flights between the United Kingdom 
and the northern part of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control 
over the territory after Turkey occupied it in 1974. The State formed in north Cyprus is not 
recognised as an independent State by the international community. The Republic of Cyprus, 
in contrast, is a contracting state to the Chicago Convention.17 
 
Freedom of navigation is a well-established principle of customary international law. Freedom 
of navigation prevailed because States needed unhindered access to the seas for trading 
purposes and as a means for maritime powers to secure passage to other areas of political or 
military influence. Moreover, it derives from the fact that States cannot sustain their control 
over vast ocean areas. Freedom loosely translates to two areas of the sea. In the territorial sea, 
the coastal States could exercise exclusive sovereignty, but foreign vessels enjoy navigation 
rights. In contrast, there is no state sovereignty in the high seas, and all States enjoy complete 
freedom of navigation.18 In territorial sea, foreign ships enjoy a right of innocent passage, 
                                                 
15 Milde, M. International air law and ICAO. Vol. 4 of Essential air and space law. Utrecht: Eleven International 
Publishing 2008, p. 43. 
16 Franklin, M. Sovereignty and the Chicago Convention: English Court of Appeal Rules on the Northern Cyprus 
Question. Air & Space Law 2011/36, No 2, pp. 109-116. 
17 Ibidem, pp. 109-110 




which is also available to warships provided they comply with the coastal State's laws and 
regulations concerning passage.19  
 
Furthermore, the regime of transit passage may be applicable for state vessels and aircraft in 
international straits defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) Art. 37. Transit passage regime applies to straits used for international navigation 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and another part of 
the high seas or an EEZ.20 State aircraft in transit passage will generally comply with 
elementary safety measures and will at all times operate with due regard for the safety of 
navigation. Also, they must monitor the radio frequency assigned by the competent 
internationally designated air traffic control (ATC) authority or the appropriate international 
distress radio frequency.21 It is argued that strait States do not have the right to adopt air routes 
in respect of aircraft exercising the right of transit passage and that military aircraft exercising 
the right of transit passage does not have to comply with the ICAO's Rules of the Air.22 
 
The Chicago Convention did not establish a multilateral air transport scheme providing for 
freedoms of overflight and landing. The right to grant traffic rights remains essentially within 
the domain of each State's sovereign powers. Under customary international law, every flight 
over foreign territory is subject to the consent of the overflown State. The right of innocent 
passage as stipulated in the law of the sea has never been extended to foreign aircraft flying 
over the territorial sea.23 Furthermore, as state aircraft are excluded from the scope of the 
Chicago Convention, even if the innocent passage principles would apply to foreign aircraft 
in the territorial sea, they would be excluded from it. Article 3 (c) of the Chicago Convention 
explicitly says that no state aircraft of the contracting States shall fly over the territory of any 
State without authorisation by special agreement or otherwise.  
 
Freedom of overflight is not exercised according to international customary law, and no 
international convention on freedom of overflight is universally accepted. The International 
                                                 
19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay 10.12.1982, e.i.f. 16.11.1994, Art. 19. 
20 Ibidem, Art. 37 
21 UNCLOS, Art. 39 (3) 
22 Lott, A. The Estonian Straits: Exceptions to the Strait Regime of Innocent or Transit Passage. Tartu: University 
of Tartu Press 2017, pp. 118-119 
23 Hailbronner, op. cit., pp. 491-492. 
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Air Services Transit Agreement of 194424 aims to grant the privileges to fly across the 
contracting State’s territory without landing and land for non-traffic purposes. There are 
several political, military, and security-based reasons why it was never universally accepted. 
It is stated that the States should re-evaluate the current understanding of exclusively sovereign 
airspace, which was primarily implemented due to the First World War and recognise the 
positive opportunities these two freedoms would provide.25 
 
An overflight takes place when an aircraft performs an international flight, meaning it leaves 
the airspace of the State where it is registered and is, therefore, the State of its nationality.26 
After leaving the airspace of its State of nationality, the aircraft can enter and fly through either 
the national airspace of another State or through international airspace.27 
 
International airspace is strongly connected to the concept of "high seas" in international law 
of the sea and its freedoms and regulation in UNCLOS Article 87 (especially the freedom of 
overflight). It can be defined as airspace excluding every other States' airspace. Inside 
international airspace, the aircraft have freedom of overflight. It includes the airspace over the 
high seas and the same degree the airspace over EEZs according to UNCLOS Article 58 (1).  
 
In conclusion, derived from the sovereignty principle, the permissibility of overflight by 
foreign state aircraft in the state's national airspace is usually governed by the State being 
overflown. These aircraft must comply with the State's regulation; for example, they must 
have the necessary permits or clearances. The duration of the flight over state airspace does 
not have a difference in this matter. The process of applying these permits is further analysed 




                                                 
24 The International Air Services Transit Agreement. Chicago: 07.12.1944. e.i.f. 30.01.1945. 
25 20. Lee, J. ., Revisiting freedom of overflight in international air law: Minimum multilateralism in 
international air transport. Air & Space Law 2013/38, No. 4-5, pp. 367-369. 
26 The Chicago Convention, Art. 17. 
27 Demeyere, B. Wouters, J. Overflight. The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2008, para. 1. 
13 
 
1.1.2. Definition of state aircraft in international law and cases of ambiguity 
 
The Chicago Convention distinctly regulates civil aviation, and state aircraft are primarily 
exempt from its scope. International air law deals only with civil aircraft and purposely 
excludes its applicability to state aircraft's status and operation.28 For this thesis, it is essential 
to ascertain a thorough definition of state aircraft and find the legal distinction between state 
and civil aircraft. Firstly, it is for narrowing the subject matter. Secondly, national regulations 
are differentiated into these two categories. Thirdly, and most importantly, for the 
criminalisation of state aircraft unlawful entry into Estonian national airspace, we must know 
which aircraft are or can be considered state aircraft in the first place. International law does 
give a clear distinction between state and civil aircraft, but a few examples can be found and 
studied.  
 
The concept of a public aircraft was defined in the first formal diplomatic conference on air 
navigation. Aircraft is considered public when employed in a contracting State and placed 
under the orders of a duly commissioned officer of that State.29 Furthermore, the Paris 
Convention of 191930 defined state and private aircraft. According to Article 30 of the Paris 
Convention, military aircraft and other aircraft exclusively employed in state services, such as 
posts, customs, and police, are deemed state aircraft. Every other aircraft is considered a 
private aircraft.31 
 
Interestingly the same article purports that state aircraft other than military, customs, and 
police aircraft shall be treated as private aircraft and shall be subject to all provisions of the 
Convention.32 Military aircraft are further defined as every aircraft commanded by a person in 
military service detailed for the purpose.33 Paris Convention was liberal by today's standards 
as it allowed freedom on innocence passage over States in time of peace without any 
distinction as to the nationality of the aircraft.34 This rule did not apply to military aircraft, and 
                                                 
28 Milde, op. cit., p. 60. 
29 de Oliveira, R. The Distinction between Civil and State Aircraft: Does the Current Legal Framework Provide 
Sufficient Clarity of Law with Regard to Civil and State Aircraft in Relation to Aviation Practicalities? - Air & 
Space Law 2016/41, No. 4/5, p. 331. 
30 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation. Paris 13.10.1919, e.i.f. 1922 (Paris Convention)   
31 Ibidem, Art. 30 
32 Ibidem, Art. 30. 
33 Ibidem, Art. 31. 
34 Ibidem, Art. 2. 
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they need a special authorisation for overflight or landing.35 Therefore, from the start of 
international air law, military aircraft were given a special status restricting their freedom of 
operation in foreign sovereign airspace.36 
 
The distinction of military aircraft from civil aircraft was a substantial problem for adapting 
the Versailles Peace treaty when the Allied States tried to confiscate some German 
aeronautical equipment as "military". At the same time, Germany claimed it to be "civil".37 
This resulted in the formulation of "Nine Rules" on 5th May 1922 that was the base of this 
distinction.38 According to these rules, military aircraft included all aircraft capable of flying 
without a pilot, every single-seater aircraft of more than 60 horsepower, all aircraft constructed 
in such manner as to allow the addition of armaments such as machine guns, bomb racks, 
torpedos, etc., all aircraft which could exceed a speed of about 106 miles an hour while flying 
at the height of about 6500 feet, or which carried fuel for more than 4 hours' flight at full 
power, or which could transport total cargo in excess of 1320 pounds (approx. 600 kg) 
including the pilot, crew, passengers, or freight.39 Even to the standards of that time, these 
rules were of no use. Germany proved that much of the civil aviation equipment operated by 
the Allies over Germany met the criteria of military aircraft. The attempt to define military 
aircraft strictly by technical parameters proved to be futile. The civil or military nature of an 
aircraft cannot be determined solely based on its technical features.40 
 
As stated, the Chicago Convention is addressed to civil aviation and civil aircraft. From Article 
3 of the Convention concerning its applicability only to civil aviation, several conclusions can 
be deducted. The Chicago Convention as such does not apply to state aircraft; hence, even the 
law-making power of the ICAO Council to adopt Standards and Recommended Practices 
(SARPs) and the overall mandate of the Organization is reserved to civil aircraft. State aircraft 
are not permitted to fly over or land in foreign sovereign territory otherwise than with the 
concerned authority.41 This does not, however, mean that these standards never apply to 
military aircraft. There were several instances when the purpose of ICAO regulations was 
                                                 
35 Ibidem, Art. 32. 
36 Milde, op. cit., p. 62. 
37 Ibidem, p 62. 
38 Ibidem, p 63. 
39 Fedele, F. Overflight by Military Aircraft in time of Peace. The United States Air Force JAG Law review 
1967/9, No. 5, pp. 10-11. 
40 Milde, op. cit. p. 63. 
41 Ibidem, pp. 63-64. 
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specifically to control actions performed by military aircraft. Appendix 2 of Annex 2 to the 
Convention does regulate the interception of civil aircraft. These rules were enacted following 
the shooting down of Korean Air flight 007 by USSR interceptor SU-15.42 
 
The presumption given in the Chicago Convention about state aircraft is well-known. Aircraft 
used in military, customs, and polices services shall be deemed state aircraft (Chicago 
Convention Article 3 (b). Of course, a State carries out many more functions such as coast 
guard, search and rescue, medical services, mapping or geological survey services, disaster 
relief, VIP, and Government transport. Consequently, the examples provided by the Chicago 
Convention Article 3 (b) cannot be taken as all-comprehensive. Other functions should also 
be included in the defining aspects of state aircraft.43 The wording of the Chicago Convention 
suggests the drafters leaned in favour of a functional approach to determining the status of the 
aircraft as civil and military, regardless of the design, technical characteristics, registration, or 
ownership. Therefore, the status of an aircraft should be determined by the function it performs 
at a given time. Thus, it is possible that the same aircraft may be state aircraft in one situation 
and civil aircraft in another.44 It is proposed that the status of each flight should be determined 
by an approved flight plan accepted by the State to be overflown and specifying the nature of 
the flight as either civil or military.45 Overall, there is no reliable and generally accepted legal 
definition of a civil aircraft and a state aircraft.46 
 
The following elements could be reasonably be considered in determining the military nature 
of the flight of an aircraft. The nationality and registration of an aircraft may designate the 
aircraft as military. Still, the fact itself is not conclusive proof that the aircraft is used as 
military in each situation. The fact that a State or a defence ministry owns the aircraft is 
relevant. The nature of the flight, flight plan, communications procedures, secrecy 
classification, and cargo carried, such as military equipment, including weapons, is relevant. 
Whether the operator of the aircraft is defence ministry, military, customs, or police is 
appropriate. Area of operation refers to whether the aircraft is flying in a theatre of military 
operation in an international armed conflict.47 
                                                 
42 Ibidem, p. 67. 
43 Ibidem, p. 70. 
44 Ibidem, p. 71. 
45 Ibidem, p. 73. 
46 Ibidem, p. 69. 
47 Bourbonniere, M. Haeck, L. Military Aircraft and International Law: Chicago Opus 3. Journal of Air Law and 




When looking at the national legislature, the Estonian Aviation Act defines state aircraft as an 
aircraft used in Defence Forces, customs, or police services.48 This definition is in line with 
the Chicago Convention but grammatically narrower than the presumption given in the latter. 
The definition itself is closed to only these activities, and it cannot be widened to include 
aircraft which may perform other functions of a State, e.g., search and rescue, mapping, VIP 
flight etc. It is unknown whether this definition is purposely narrow or it does not include other 
categories by an oversight. Nevertheless, this definition limits discretion when dealing with 
possible airspace violators, as every aircraft must be labelled into the given narrow categories. 
It discards other functions a State may perform, and therefore it must be further looked into 
broadening the definition. 
 
When looking at Russian Federation state or military flight in the Baltic region, the route most 
used is from the Russian mainland to Kaliningrad oblast. Geographically the fastest direct 
route to-and-from Kaliningrad oblast is through Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. However, as 
state aircraft have to have permission to fly over another State's territory, the most direct route 
becomes virtually impossible. It is doubtful that the Baltic States would grant clearances or 
permits (as it is a discretionary decision) to Russian military (of which some may be armed) 
aircraft for flying over their national territory for geopolitical reasons. From the other 
perspective, Russian military services would also not be very keen on filing the applications 
for clearances. They are very detailed, and the answers may include sensitive or other 
operational information. As all aircraft enjoy the freedom of overflight over the high seas 
(UNCLOS Art. 87 (1)(b)) and over the EEZ (UNCLOS Art. 58 (1)), the best way for Russian 
state aircraft to navigate to-and-from Kaliningrad oblast is over the Baltic Sea. Luckily for 
them, this kind of route is available. 
 
From the geographical point of view, the route must traverse the Gulf of Finland. Regardless 
of its name, most of the area in question between Estonia and Finland must be legally 
considered a strait (Viro Strait).49 In this strait, Estonia’s and Finland’s territorial sea are 
separated by an approximately 6 NM wide EEZ corridor established by a bilateral Agreement 
                                                 
48 Estonian Aviation Act, § 5 (3). 
49 Lott, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
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between Estonia and Finland in 1994.50 With this Agreement, Estonia and Finland limited 
their right to extend their territorial sea up to the limit of 12 miles measured from the baseline 
as it is stipulated in UNCLOS Article 3. The primary aim was to ensure free passage through 
the Gulf of Finland, and it was explained in the Estonian Parliament as a voluntary political 
self-limitation.51 
 
Nevertheless, the extension of the width of the Estonian territorial sea was once again under 
public discussion in 200552 . It was proposed in a draft act to the parliament in 2007.53 It is 
argued that the extension of the Estonian territorial sea in the Gulf of Finland would, contrary 
to the common understanding, increase concerns to Estonian national security. It is due to Viro 
Strait being considered as an international strait under UNCLOS Article 37. In contrast, the 
regime of transit passage would apply to it if Estonia and Finland would not have decided to 
establish the beforementioned EEZ.54  
 
Furthermore, transit passage applies from coast to coast55, except for internal waters within a 
strait where establishing a straight baseline had the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas 
that had not previously been considered (UNCLOS Article 35 (a)). In the case of Estonia, the 
internal waters may be outside of the regime of transit passage if the foreign State recognises 
Estonia's State continuity. As the Russian Federation does not recognise Estonia's State 
continuity, it would not be impossible from their perspective that the regime of transit passage 
would also apply to Estonia's internal waters.56 Therefore, if the transit passage regime would 
apply to the Gulf of Finland (Viro Strait), Russian state aircraft would have more freedom to 
navigate through the area in close vicinity of Tallinn.57 This right may also not be impeded by 
the strait State as stipulated in UNCLOS Article 38 (1). 
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From the perspective of this thesis, the beforementioned route has exciting ramifications. 
Mostly, that almost every aircraft using this route to fly from mainland Russia to Kaliningrad 
oblast does this for a reason to avoid entering into foreign State's national airspace. Therefore, 
aircraft navigating the course do not have to apply for permits or clearances from national 
governmental institutions and disclose in detail its purpose, cargo, personnel etc. It can be 
reasoned that aircraft that use this route may be deemed as state aircraft performing a state 
function whatever aircraft is used. Civil aircraft, in contrast, can fly according to rules enacted 
by international aviation bodies and may take a shorter route over the Baltic States; for 
example, several Russian civil airlines traverse this route daily. An aircraft behaviour, in this 
case, can be a significant indicator that it may be a state aircraft but relying solely on the fact 
may prove to be inconclusive. 
  
Defining state aircraft may prove difficult, especially when regarding border-line cases and 
different national understandings. Nevertheless, the classification of an aircraft has multiple 
effects on the application of national and international regulations. Estonian Aviation Act has 
a relevantly narrow definition of state aircraft, and few state functions are included in the 
description. Whether intentional or accidental, it limits control over Estonian national airspace 
and may cause further ambiguity and problems even to operational flexibility.  
 
1.1.3. Procedure for granting permits for state aircraft entry into Estonian airspace 
 
The previous subchapter ascertained that no state aircraft could enter another State's airspace 
without special authorisation under international law. Therefore, any foreign state aircraft that 
do not have special permission is committing an airspace violation.  
 
In Estonia, the authorisation is given by a permit or a clearance which is a well-established 
mean. Flight permits are issued under the National Defence Act § 43.58 The procedure for 
procuring a permit is more detailed in a regulation established by the Government of the 
                                                 




Republic.59 Therefore, Estonia has established foreign state aircraft entering national airspace 
as a concern of defence and security. 
 
There are two types of flight permits: for single entry or multiple entries.60 The applications 
of the permits are submitted to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) of Estonia.61 There are some 
exceptions to this regulation. For example, an aircraft of a Member State of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) involved in protecting Estonian airspace or securing its 
inviolability may enter Estonian airspace, land on, or fly over Estonian territory without the 
application for the beforementioned clearance.62 Included in this category are also foreign state 
aircraft performing air policing function for Estonia. The approach differentiates foreign States 
according to their trustworthiness. 
 
Multiple entry clearances are usually annual, and for the Member States of NATO and the 
European Union, they are granted without applying. In these cases, prior notification for entry 
into Estonian airspace is not needed, except for aircraft fitted with intelligence, surveillance, 
target acquisition, reconnaissance, or electronic warfare equipment, even if this equipment is 
turned off. Aircraft with that kind of equipment must notify the Defence Forces one day before 
entry to Estonian airspace or landing on or flying over Estonian territory.63 Annual flight 
clearance does not apply to foreign state aircraft carrying weapons, ammunition, explosives 
or other dangerous goods, and aircraft that have turned on its intelligence, surveillance, target 
acquisition when entering Estonian airspace reconnaissance or electronic warfare equipment.64 
Meaning, these aircraft will have to apply for a single entry permit. 
 
As mentioned in the previous subchapter, the Estonian legislature defines an aircraft as a state 
aircraft used in Defence Forces, customs, or police services. Civil aircraft that need similar 
special authorisation is aircraft making a flight related to the state visit of a head of State or a 
member of the government of a foreign State or a flight associated with another official visit 
                                                 
59 Ibidem, § 43 (2). 
60 Välisriigi sõjalaevale territoriaal- või sisevetesse sisenemise loa ning välisriigi riiklikule õhusõidukile 
õhuruumi sisenemise loa andmise kord (Procedure for the Issue of Permits for Entry of Foreign Military Vessels 
in Estonian Territorial Waters or Inland Waters and Permits for Entry into Estonian Airspace of Foreign State 
Military Aircraft, for their Landing on Estonian Territory or for their Flying over the Territory). Adopted 
28.01.2016, e.i.f. 05.02.2016 (RT I, 28.06.2017, 59, § 2 (2). 
61 Ibidem, § 3 
62 Ibidem, § 1 (3). 
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that is significant politically or another diplomatic mission (a diplomatic flight).65 Contrary to 
the clearances granted to state aircraft, this permit is issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA).66 The regulation also purports that the MFA can only grant permits that the MOD 
does not process.67 It is not uncommon that diplomatic flights are carried out with aircraft 
which cannot be categorised under civil aircraft. For example, US Air Force operates at least 
two Boeing VC-25 aircraft, which are military versions of the well-known Boeing 747 cruiser, 
and are commonly used for VIP transport, especially of the United States President. 
 
Concerning issues with state security, the latter permits are of lesser importance. Still, they are 
nevertheless coordinated by the MOD and the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board (only 
when the aircraft is applying for a landing permit).68 It clearly defines that all matters relating 
to state aircraft are under the close supervision of the military leadership. It links perfectly to 
the concept of the Defence Forces being the primary guardian of the Estonian national 
airspace. 
 
Application forms for these permits are available on the web sites of MOD and MFA. The 
application for a flight must be submitted to the MFA in good time, at least five working days 
before the estimated arrival of the aircraft in Estonian territory. The diplomatic clearance form 
for state aircraft requires more information from the applying party and therefore is more 
detailed. The procedure for granting said permits is confidential, and the subject applying the 
permits is given only the final decision. In this research, the process itself is not essential; only 
granting the permit or rejection of the application is of interest. 
 
The main issue of this procedure is that it is based on the goodwill of the applying State and 
is virtuously unpoliceable by national law enforcement agencies. It is challenging to ascertain 
if a flight needs a permit when declared as a civilian aircraft but is conducting a flight of 
diplomatic importance. It would require further coordination between different branches of 
law enforcement and the military. Nevertheless, deciding on differentiating these two separate 
categories may prove difficult in time-critical situations. 
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1.2. The competencies of Estonian Defence Forces to protect, guard, and conduct 
surveillance of the national airspace 
 
Maintaining security on the national border is not an easy task. This task is more complicated 
relating to the air border. It is not policeable by physical means due to its dimensions but relies 
on different sensors usually deployed only by the military. The following two subchapters will 
analyse how the Estonian Defence Forces perform the task for securing Estonian national 
airspace and which role is assigned to allied forces. 
 
1.2.1. Protection of national airspace 
 
According to the Estonian State Borders Act, protecting national airspace is given to the 
Defence Forces.69 The Defence Forces hold the function of protection and is authorised to 
guard the airspace.70 The Defence Forces carries out the function by its armed services, in this 
case, the Air Force. Section 18 (2) of the State Border Act also gives the option to include 
armed forces of a State being party to an agreement containing the principle of collective self-
defence entered into with the Republic of Estonia in the performance of this task.71 This, of 
course, means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the forces most suited to this task 
are assets of the Baltic Air Policing (BAP) mission.  
 
The protection of national airspace is an integral part of the protection of the national territory. 
The purpose of protecting national airspace also includes safeguarding the safety and security 
of flight, the observance of aviation regulations, and the life and property on the ground. The 
protection is usually carried out by national police forces or by the military and is done by 
intercepting the suspect aircraft using a state aircraft, e.g. a fighter jet. An aircraft may be 
suspect when it does not identify itself, appears unexpectedly in the airspace contrary to the 
recorded flight plans or schedules, flies beyond the established air route or even over a 
                                                 
69 State Borders Act, § 18 (1). 
70 Ibidem. 
71 Ibidem, § 18 (2). 
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prohibited or restricted area, by not communicating with the Air Traffic Services (ATS) or by 
appearing to perform improper operations or manoeuvres.72 
 
The primary means of dealing with a state aircraft that unlawfully enter a States' national 
airspace are firstly the interception of said aircraft for identification. Secondly, the aircraft can 
be directed to leave the violated airspace by a determined route. Thirdly, the aircraft can be 
directed or even forced to land for further investigation or prosecution. The use of weapons 
against this aircraft committing an airspace violation in peacetime would be reprehensible and 
contrary to all humanitarian concepts and hardly a proportionate use of force. Nevertheless, 
the codified international law does not recognise the general prohibition of the use of weapons 
against state aircraft and, in particular military aircraft.73 
 
In principle, the unlawful intrusion of foreign aircraft into national airspace constitutes an 
attack on the State. It may result in self-defence measures against the aircraft, whether it is a 
response by air-to-air assets or surface-based air defence (SBAD) weapon systems. As 
mentioned before, the use of force against an intruding foreign military aircraft is commonly 
understood and accepted. It is not the case for civil aircraft.74  
 
Article 3 bis (a) of the Chicago Convention purports that contracting States must refrain from 
resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight; moreover, in the case of 
interception, the lives of passengers onboard and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. 
The key is proportionality, especially when dealing with civil aviation. The least deadly 
measures should be considered foremost. Article 3 bis (b) highlights the option of the forcible 
landing of the aircraft at some designated airport. With this reservation, the protection of 
national airspace with deadly weapons even against civil aircraft is not excluded in principle. 
Still, it is highly disputed whether the downing of an aircraft constitutes a legitimate means in 
terms of ultima ratio.75 
 
Interception of civil aircraft is thoroughly regulated and is seen as a last resort action. When 
intercepting a civil aircraft, the operation should be limited only to determining the aircraft's 
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identity. Exceptions to this rule would be the aim of returning the aircraft to its planned track, 
directing it beyond the boundaries of national airspace, guiding it away from prohibited, 
restricted or dangerous areas, or instructing it to land at a designated airfield. Practice 
interception of civil aircraft is not permitted.76 Interception of civil aircraft may be used in 
cases of emergency, unlawful interference, or communication failure. 
 
The use of deadly force against civil aircraft suspected of being used as a weapon (a Renegade 
aircraft) against the territory, infrastructure or population of a State cannot be ruled out by 
international law. The use of such force must observe the requirement of proportionality, and 
the decision-making authority authorising or ordering the use of force should be vested in a 
constitutionally designed body or person.77 The Estonian Defence Forces may be used to 
counter threat imposed by civil aircraft if there is reason to believe that the flight of the civil 
aircraft has been unlawfully interfered with. It may be used to cause damage to a person's 
property.78 The procedure is highly regulated, and the use of force is a last resort measure. The 
extend of the standards is decided by the minister responsible for the area or a minister 
authorised by the Government of the Republic.79 Regulation of the Government of the 
Republic further states that this responsibility lies foremost on the Defence Minister.80 It must 
be said that these kind of incidents are very fast-paced due to the nature of air transport and 
therefore decisions and actions undertaken against said targets must be done effectively and 
with the highest regard to the situation. 
 
To summarise, intrusion into national airspace may give rise to self-defence measures and 
acting on these incidents are done mainly by the military, in this case, the Estonian Defence 
Forces, which protects the national airspace of Estonia. The use of deadly force against foreign 
aircraft is not principally prohibited but must be avoided at all costs, especially against civil 
aircraft. The distinction between civil and state aircraft becomes even more critical and has an 
inamountable effect on the choice and weight of the appropriate response. The use of force 
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against an aircraft would result in a death sentence to the pilot and all passengers onboard the 
aircraft.  
 
1.2.2. Guarding the national airspace 
 
Protection of the airspace is the result of incidents connected to foreign aircraft. Firstly, the 
competent institutions must detect, identify, and react to these incidents to determine necessary 
force measures. Regarding airspace, it is impossible to distinguish air surveillance from the 
function of guarding because no detection means no reasonable way for reacting to the 
incident. Therefore, air surveillance is the pillar on top of which protection and safeguarding 
of the airspace sit. 
 
Air surveillance in the modern era can be effectively done only by electromagnetic means, 
which usually includes different sensors. This is mainly due to the speed and height of the 
aircraft being operated. Visual means of identification can be implemented in areas where 
there is more risk of aircraft flying at a low altitude, but the weather is a significant factor.  
 
“Air surveillance is conducted using a wide array of electromagnetic devices. It can be 
characterised in terms of coverage volume (the volume of airspace in which the system 
operates to specification), accuracy (a measure of the difference between the estimated and 
the actual position of an aircraft), integrity (an indication that the aircraft's estimated position 
is within a stated containment volume of its actual position), update rate (the rate at which 
aircraft's position is updated to users), reliability (the probability that the system will continue 
operating to specification within a defined period), and availability (the percentage of the total 
operating time during which the system is performing to specification).”81 
 
The most prominent of these measures are air surveillance radars. “Radar is a technology that 
detects the range and azimuth of an aircraft. It is based upon the difference in time between 
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the transmission of pulses to the aircraft and the receipt of energy from the aircraft.” Two main 
radars are the primary surveillance radar (PSR) and the secondary surveillance radar (SSR).82 
 
“The former transmits a high-power signal, some of which is reflected by the aircraft back to 
the radar. The radar then determines the aircraft's position in the range from the elapsed time 
between transmission and reception of the reflection. PSR does not provide the aircraft's 
identity; however, PSR does not require any specific equipment on the aircraft.”83 This is the 
primary radar type considering military activities because it can detect aircraft that do not want 
to be seen, e.g. an aircraft that is not using a transponder. 
 
The latter systems “consist of two main elements, a ground-based interrogator/receiver and an 
aircraft transponder. The aircraft's transponder responds to interrogations from the ground 
station, enabling the aircraft's range and bearing from the ground station to be determined. In 
many cases, the two radar types are deployed together.”84 As mentioned before, SSR's 
effectiveness depends on aircraft using a transponder and therefore can have only limited 
applications for the full spectrum of air surveillance. It further highlights the importance of 
activated transponders, making air surveillance much more effortless and gives the authority 
more options to differentiate between aircraft categories. Interestingly, aircraft not using an 
activated transponder may be more conclusively regarded as military aircraft. 
 
On a Baltic scale, air surveillance has a long history of cooperation between the Defence 
Forces of each country. The decision for an integrated air surveillance system in the Baltics 
was already made in 1994-1995 but came into effect a few years later in 1998. 85 It was well 
before the Baltic States joined NATO in 2004. After that, Baltic Air Surveillance Network and 
Control System (BALTNET) operated inside the NATO force structure and contributed to 
NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). A significant change 
occurred in 2020 when one jointly staffed Combined Control and Reporting Centre (CRC86) 
in Karmelava, Lithuania, was replaced by three national CRC to enhance the region's air 
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surveillance and control capabilities.87 BALTNET aims to secure the sovereignty of the 
national airspace of the Baltic States by continuously using nationally owned air surveillance 
assets and air command and control systems, hence contributing to the safeguarding of the 
integrity of NATO airspace.88 
 
The function of guarding the national airspace is done by the Air Force, an armed service of 
the Defence Forces. One of the structural units of the Air Force is the Air Surveillance Wing 
(ASW).89 By regulation of the Government of the Republic, the ASW has the right to collect 
and process signals transmitted or travelling outside the publicly available electronic 
communications networks located in the territory of the Republic of Estonia and pictures and 
images of the earth or sea and of objects in the use of a foreign State which are located outside 
of the territory or have entered the territory of the Republic of Estonia to conduct military 
intelligence.90 
 
The primary purpose of the ASW is to safeguard the integrity of Estonian national airspace by 
contributing to the NATINAMDS with robust early warning and air defence mission 
command and control in peacetime, crisis, and war.91 For this task, the ASW uses its tactical 
units and its assets. In its arsenal, the ASW has four radars: two Ground Master 403 radars in 
the south-eastern and western part of Estonia, one TPS-77 radar in the north-eastern part of 
Estonia, and one ASR-8 radar in the northern part of Estonia inside the Ämari airbase.92 
 
One of the tactical units in the ASW is the CRC Tallinn, one of the CRC in BALTNET. CRC 
Tallinn's main objective is to safeguard the sovereignty of the Estonian airspace by detecting 
and identifying flying objects inside and in the vicinity of Estonian airspace.93 
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To summarise, air surveillance is the pillar for guarding the national airspace. It is conducted 
mainly by using different radars. For maximum effect, primary and secondary surveillance 
radars are used together. Information from the primary surveillance radars may be used to help 
Tallinn ATC. The Defence Forces, which has the function of guarding the national airspace 
of Estonia, does this task by using the assets of its armed services and structural units. The 
lowest tactical unit responsible for the function is CRC Tallinn, which is a part of the more 
comprehensive Baltic air surveillance network. 
 
1.3. Baltic Air Policing as a measure of collective self-defence principle  
 
Air Policing is a concept that first came into existence in the interwar period between 1919 
until 1939 when it was developed by the Royal Air Force and conducted in the Middle-East 
and eastern African coast. Great Britain used airpower in different circumstances, in some 
cases to replace or substitute land forces; in other cases, ground campaigns had been conducted 
for decades before the use of airpower had even been considered.94 The definition of air 
policing is to use airpower to support the internal security of the State, not different to a typical 
police force. Inherent in the meaning is the notion of a mandate granted by a legal authority 
such as a national sovereign government or an international body with some reasonable 
jurisdictional claim.95 
 
NATO Air Policing is not a defence mission but a peacetime mission carried out under 
NATINAMDS to ensure the integrity of Allied airspace.96 It aims to secure the skies over 
Europe, maintaining a Force that is in readiness to react to air incidents 24/7/365. The decision 
to scramble air policing mission aircraft, or Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) Interceptor aircraft, 
is first done by detecting a significant air incident. It may include an aircraft that is not using 
its transponder or is not in two-way radio contact with civilian ATC, or has not filed a valid 
flight plan. When the decision is made to react to the incident, QRA aircraft are launched in 
minutes. They are directed by a CRC and brought up close to the unidentified aircraft. During 
the interception, the main aim is to identify the aircraft and establish visual contact with the 
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pilot-in-command of the intercepted aircraft. The QRA aircraft may escort the intercepted 
aircraft to a nearby airfield to land or escort it out of NATO airspace.97 
 
The Baltic Air Policing mission started in 2004 when the three Baltic States joined NATO. 
“Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not have the required aircraft assets to contribute to NATO 
Air Policing over their territories”; Alliance members provide the necessary capabilities. The 
capability was established at Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania by a detachment of QRA fighter 
jets. Unlike the overall NATO Air Policing mission, the QRA assets assigned in the Baltics 
are often launched to identify Russian Federation Air Force aircraft visually. The high Russian 
Federation Air Force flight activity near the Baltic States is due to the geographical situation 
of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. “Russian air assets regularly fly from mainland Russia 
to Kaliningrad and vice-versa.” In many cases, the Russian military aircraft approach or pass 
close to the NATO airspace without using transponders, lacking two-way communication with 
civilian ATC services in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, filing a valid flight plan.98 After Russia 
annexed the Crimean Peninsula, NATO introduced Enhanced Air Policing, thus augmented 
the BAP with a second detachment deployed in Ämari Air Base in Estonia.99 
 
The highest risk of Russian Federation military flight in the vicinity of NATO airspace is their 
lack of usage of transponders. Flying without a transponder makes the target aircraft invisible 
to Secondary Surveillance Radars commonly used in ATC services. Foremost it is a flight 
safety issue, and several highly reported incidents have occurred that influenced civilian air 
traffic in the region.100 It is argued that the possible outcome of not using active transponders 
may be loss of communication, airspace infringement, failure of separation, etc.101 The risk 
derived from these consequences may be mitigated to some extent by filing a proper flight 
plan or establishing two-way radio contact with the appropriate air traffic control agency. 
Nevertheless, an activated transponder is the most effective way to combat serious risk to 
flight safety. 
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Due to the high traffic of these kinds of flights, the air policing assets stationed in the Baltics 
make several hundred interception flights on Russian aircraft in a year; a significant increase 
occurred between 2018 and 2019.102 Most of the 400 air policing missions scrambled by 
NATO air force assets in 2020 were in response to flights by the Russian military.103 
 
As mentioned before, in protecting and guarding the Estonian national airspace, the Defence 
Forces may include foreign military assets like the air policing aircraft. Their involvement is 
limited to the function of the air policing aircraft, which is a peacetime force aiming for visual 
identification and, if necessary, escorting the intercepted aircraft out of NATO airspace or to 
land at a designated airfield. Furthermore, as the air policing aircraft is not an asset of the 
Estonian Defence Forces, their usage in response to incidents is not decided by Estonian 
commanders or governmental officials, but by NATO Air Command, especially the Combined 
Air Operations Centre in Germany.104 This is intentional due to the high operational and 
political risk these kinds of missions can have. Nevertheless, it is a limitation when choosing 
the appropriate response to an air incident like an airspace violation. 
 
In theory, Baltic Air Policing aircraft may be used in response to a Renegade situation, where 
the final decision is made by an Estonian governmental official, usually the Minister of 
Defence. The intervention of a Renegade aircraft mandates that the NATO Air Policing 
aircraft are under the command authority of the Minister of Defence or any competent agency 
of the Government of the Republic. Transfer of the command authority may be done only 
according to a bilateral agreement between Estonia and the State to which the aircraft 
belongs.105 Given the ramifications of the situation where a foreign military fighter jet 
intervenes in the flight path or uses deadly force against a civilian aircraft inside Estonian 
airspace, it is not likely that these kinds of agreements can ever be formulated without any 
extraordinary circumstances. 
                                                 
102 Wright, H. NATO Baltic Air Policing mission made record number of flights in 2019. ERR News, 17.01.2020. 
- https://news.err.ee/1025175/nato-baltic-air-policing-mission-made-record-number-of-flights-in-2019 
[15.02.2021]. 
103 NATO Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office. NATO Intercepts Hundreds of Russian Military Jets in 
2020. 28.12.2020. -  https://ac.nato.int/archive/2020/NATO_AP_in_2020  [15.02.2021]. 
104 NATO Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office. Combined Air Operations Centre Uedem. - 
https://ac.nato.int/about/caoc/uedem [15.02.2021]. 
105 Jõu kasutamine tsiviilõhusõiduki tekitatud ohu tõrjumiseks. (The Use of Force to Counter Threats Posed by 




Therefore, air policing assets' primary purpose is to respond to unidentified aircraft flying in 
NATO airspace or approaching it. In the European theatre, most of these aircraft are Russian 
Federation military aircraft. An interception aims to identify and, if necessary, escort the 
intercepted aircraft out of NATO airspace or escort the aircraft to land in a designated airfield. 
It remains unclear which actions may be conducted by the interception aircraft in the 
completion of this task. Air policing aircraft are not under Estonian command authority, 
limiting their usage in protecting Estonian airspace. Still, due to the combined nature of Baltic 
Air Policing, it is imperative to conduct these missions with high regard to safety precautions. 
It is unknown how many tasks are undertaken in reference to Estonian airspace violations and 
if and how they would differ from the usual function of air policing aircraft.  
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Airspace violations that have importance in this research are characterised as foreign state 
aircraft entry into Estonian airspace without a necessary flight permit or clearance. Also 
included are civilian flights with diplomatic significance (diplomatic flights), which should 
have had a diplomatic flight clearance issued by the MFA. The period of interest is designed 
as 2017 up to 2021. Almost all Estonian airspace violations in the period have occurred in the 
exact geographical location and have very similar circumstances. They all happened in the 
vicinity of Vaindloo island. 
 
2.1. The curious case of Vaindloo island 
 
Vaindloo island (59º 49' N 26º 21' E) is the northernmost point of Estonia, situated in the Gulf 
of Finland. Its surface area is approximately 6,7 hectare, and its circumference a mere 2,2 
kilometres. The island itself is mostly uninhabited except for a lighthouse and its keeper and 
a border guard radar facility. With its characteristics and whereabouts, it seems a somewhat 
insignificant island between Estonia, Finland, and Russia. Nothing can be further from the 
truth; the tiny island holds geopolitical importance. 
 
Due to its location as the northernmost point of Estonia, it is also the northernmost point of 
the Estonian baseline. The breadth of the territorial sea is measured according to the UNCLOS 
Article 3. There are two points of the Estonian baseline on the island (59º 49,35' N 26º 21,85' 
E and 59º 49,30' N 26º 21,60').106 The territorial sea in the area extends from the baseline to 
north and ends with the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).107 The boundary of the EEZ is still 
not determined between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation in the vicinity of 
the island.108 The breadth of the territorial sea is inherently connected with the extent of the 
national airspace. Therefore, the Estonian airspace near the island forms a distinctive corner, 
                                                 
106 Merealapiiride seadus (Maritime Boundaries Act). Adopted 10.03.1993, e.i.f. 01.06.2002 (RT 1993, 14, 217), 
Annex 1. 
107 Ibidem, Annex 1 and 2. 
108 Ibidem, Annex 3. 
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leaving a narrow corridor of EEZ between the Estonian and Finnish territorial sea. This 
commonly called "Vaindloo corner" is where almost every Estonian airspace violation occurs. 
 
The reason why these violations take place in the area is simple: Estonian authorities do not 
provide ATC services in the area.109 Flight information service is offered to give advice and 
valuable information for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. Flight information region 
(FIR) is defined as the airspace within which these services are provided.110 The FIR 
boundaries defined by EUROCONTROL are not equal to the boundary of the Estonian state 
border.111 This leaves the Vaindloo corner area outside of Estonian/Tallinn FIR and aircraft 
flying through there outside of the effective control of ATC Tallinn. Vaindloo corner area 
belongs in the FIR of Saint Petersburg of the Russian Federation and under the supervision of 
Saint Petersburg's ATC. The latter has minimal interest in the sovereignty of the national 
airspace of Estonia and conducts its duties in line with the purpose of an air traffic control 
agency. 
 
This situation has the effect where aircraft flying through the area may be inside Estonian 
airspace and the Russian controlled flight information region. It may be a blatant excuse for 
Russian state flights' current reluctance for avoiding Estonian airspace. On the other hand, the 
ramifications of this situation do not change the stance that Estonia has exclusive sovereignty 
over its airspace and all rules and regulations on permits and clearances apply. The added 
concern to this matter is that aero-navigational maps like an en-route chart112 do not include 
state borders, and there is a possibility of human error in these incidents. Nevertheless, without 
further consultation with the Russian counterpart, the issue remains. Regarding the relevantly 
straightforward clarification, it may be clouded in politically charged circumstances. The 
changing of the FIR boundary is not the primary concern, but it must be acknowledged that 
these problems are valid, and the discussion must be introduced into the public domain.  
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2.2. Case study of Estonian airspace violations 
 
This subchapter includes all publicly known Estonian airspace violations by foreign state 
aircraft in the given period. Information of these incidents are acquired from open sources, 
e.g. press releases by the Defence Forces in various media outlets. For some but not all cases, 
the representatives of the Russian Federation have given out statements about the incidents. 
All these statements have denied any airspace violation whatsoever.  
 
The main points of interest are whether the aircraft had a valid flight plan, a switched-on 
transponder device, and did the aircraft establish two-way radio contact with Tallinn ATC. 
These criteria link perfectly to the concept of air policing mentioned before. A proper flight 
plan is an excellent tool for determining the flight path of an aircraft, its intentions, and any 
relevant information regarding the flight.  
 
A switched-on transponder on an aircraft is mainly a feature relating to flight safety as civil 
ATC services do not commonly use primary surveillance radars and therefore do not have the 
means to track and identify aircraft that do not use a transponder. Lastly, establishing two-way 
radio contact with ATC services gives the latter a final and effective means of monitoring an 
aircraft and knowing its intentions. Also, various important information may be shared through 
this communication, for example, position, timings, flight path, etc. For some of the cases, 
further information was given. As for the depth of the airspace violations, no data is provided 
publicly, but due to the area's characteristics, it cannot be very extensive or comparable to the 
airspace violation mentioned in the introduction (several hundreds of kilometres).  
 
2.2.1. Estonian national airspace violations in the years 2017-2021 
 
The first reported Estonian airspace violation for 2021 took place on 3rd February113when a 
Russian Air Force aircraft Ilyushin IL-76MD (a medium-range military transport aircraft) 
entered Estonian airspace in the vicinity of Vaindloo island. The plane was inside the airspace 
                                                 




approximately for one minute, it did not have radio contact with Tallinn ATC at that time, but 
it had a working transponder. There was no information given about a flight plan. 
 
 During the year 2020, there was only one reported Estonian airspace violation. On 10th 
June,114 a Tupolev TU-204-300 (a medium-range jet airliner) entered Estonian airspace 
without a permit and remained there under a minute. The aircraft was described as belonging 
to Russian Federation. At the time of the incident, the plane did not have radio contact with 
Tallinn ATC and a valid flight plan, but it had a working transponder. The fact that no further 
information was given about the operator of the aircraft derives the incident of its merit 
because it does not provide a conclusive answer whether the aircraft could be analysed being 
a state aircraft or not. 
 
In 2019 there were three Estonian airspace violations. On 25th October,115 a Tupolev TU-154 
(a medium-range airliner) belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian 
Federation entered Estonian airspace without a permit for under a minute. The aircraft had a 
transponder but lacked the required flight plan and radio contact with Tallinn ATC at the time 
of the incident. The most detailed incident occurred on 23rd September116 when a Russian Air 
Force Sukhoi SU-34 (a supersonic medium-range fighter-bomber/strike aircraft) entered 
Estonian airspace. During the incident, the aircraft did not have a working transponder, a valid 
flight plan, or radio contact with Tallinn ATC. The Russian Ministry of Defence gave a 
statement regarding the aircraft. It was conducting a flight to Kaliningrad overflying 
international waters with high regard to international rules and did not violate any borders. 
Furthermore, the aircraft had been in contact with Estonian air traffic controllers, and all the 
evidence supports this statement. 117 The third airspace violation took place on 18th May118 
when a Tupolev TU-154 belonging to the Russian Federation Naval Service entered Estonian 
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airspace without a permit for less than a minute. During the incident, the aircraft had a 
functioning transponder and a valid flight plan but was not in radio contact with Tallinn ATC. 
 
The year 2018 was the busiest of the period selected regarding Estonian airspace violations 
amounting to six cases. Firstly, on 16th July119 , two Russian aircraft, an Airbus A319 (a short- 
to medium-range, narrow-body, commercial passenger twin-engine jet airliner) and an 
Ilyushin IL-96 (a quad jet long-haul airliner) entered Estonian airspace within an hour of each 
other. Both aircraft had a working transponder but had not filed a flight plan nor were in radio 
contact with Tallinn ATC. A news outlet reported that the aircraft belongs to a Russian state 
fleet and is used to transport top-level Russian leaders. The incident occurred in the time frame 
of a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and United States President Donald 
Trump in Helsinki.  
 
Secondly, on 12th July,120 an Ilyushin IL-76 belonging to the Russian Armed Forces entered 
Estonian airspace for less than a minute. Its transponder was switched on, but it had not filed 
a flight plan or radio contact with Tallinn ATC. Thirdly, on 10th July, an Ilyushin IL-96121 
belonging to Russian Federation entered Estonian airspace. The aircraft had a working 
transponder but did not have radio contact with Tallinn ATC nor a valid flight plan. All four 
airspace violations may be deemed to be linked to the beforementioned meeting in Helsinki. 
Fourthly, on 20th June,122 a Tupolev TU-154M belonging to the Russian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs entered Estonian airspace for a minute. The aircraft had a working transponder but was 
not in radio contact with Tallinn ATC, nor had filed a flight plan. Lastly, on 12th March,123 an 
Ilyushin IL-76MD belonging to the Russian Ministry of Defence entered Estonian airspace 
for approximately one minute. According to other sources, the aircraft was flying from the 
Caucasus region to Kaliningrad, and its registration number was RA-78850.124 The 
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registration number points to an ex-Aeroflot airliner used by the 223rd Flight Unit of the 
Russian Air Force based in Chkalovsky Airport near Moscow.125 
 
In 2017 there was reported two Estonian airspace violations. Firstly, on 21st November,126 an 
Ilyushin IL76 entered Estonian airspace for less than a minute. The aircraft had a valid flight 
plan and a working transponder but was not in radio contact with Tallinn ATC during the 
incident. In the Estonian version of the press release, the aircraft was described as a state 
aircraft.127  
 
Secondly, on 3rd May,128 an Ilyushin IL-96-300 callsign RSD008 and registration number 
RA-96019 belonging to the airline Rossiya - Special Flight Squadron entered Estonian 
airspace. The aircraft had a working transponder, but the flight plan was not submitted, and it 
had no radio contact with Tallinn ATC. Later, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
confirmed that the aircraft was used for the transportation of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
to Helsinki.129 A member of the Estonian parliament described the incident as a foolish 
sloppiness of the pilot because the particular condition in the area is widely known, and 
intrusion into Estonian airspace is easily avoidable.130 
 
2.2.2. Analysis of the violations 
 
Overall, there were thirteen publicly reported Estonian airspace violations in the given period. 
Though there are several differences between these incidents, they share a common 
geographical area and characteristics. Several aspects of them will be highlighted and further 
analysed in the following subchapter. 
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When looking at the similarities, all the aircraft did not have radio contact with Tallinn ATC 
during the violations. It is understandable due to the nature of the area mentioned before; the 
aircraft was not inside Tallinn FIR at that time. It is unknown, but these aircraft did likely have 
proper radio contact with other air traffic control agencies in the region (mostly Saint 
Petersburg). Furthermore, all these cases concluded in diplomatic means. Usually, the Russian 
ambassador in Estonia received an official note from the Foreign Ministry. For two known 
cases, the Russian authorities issued a statement denying the incident, but no public comment 
was given for the most. Denying the venture is, unfortunately, a predominant way of 
communication from the Russian side.131 As it is dealt with via diplomatic process, there is 
usually no evidence publicly from either side. 
 
From the known cases, it may be deduced that there are two main avenues of airspace 
violations. The first is the beforementioned flight path to and from Kaliningrad (for example, 
the SU-34). Most of these flights are conducted without incursion to Estonian airspace; 
therefore, there must be an approved flight path for Russian military aircraft. It is not plausible 
that some pilots do not know it.  
 
The second avenue is from mainland Russia to Finland. The cases describe several incidents 
that happened with aircraft on their way to Helsinki (S. Lavrov's visit). Circumstances of the 
Vaindloo area can also explain it; the air corridor from mainland Russia to Finland goes 
through it. For example, any aircraft travelling from Moscow to Helsinki will most probably 
fly on this path, and for civil aviation, it is not a problem.132 State flights still must have 
permission for this route. 
 
Most of these flights may be deemed as state aircraft. Furthermore, many aircraft are military 
aircraft due to their type, route, ownership, behaviour etc. The best example being the SU-34 
which is a fighter-bomber and has no civilian purpose. The flight in question may be regarded 
as the most severe incident in the given period. Due to its high speed, fast manoeuvring 
                                                 





132 Estonian Aviation Act, § 4 (4). Aircraft which have Estonian nationality, nationality of a member state of the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation or nationality of a foreign state which has entered into an agreement to 
this effect with Estonia may be flown in the Tallinn flight information region. 
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capabilities, and flying without an activated transponder can pose a significant threat to civil 
aviation in the region. 
 
On the other hand, some flights were conducted by airliners that have default multi-purpose 
usages. The flight where S. Lavrov's was onboard may be regarded as a diplomatic flight and 
therefore needed a permit to fly in the area. Still, several flights are not definitively of 
diplomatic nature. In cases where no further info was provided for its purpose, nature, or 
passengers, it cannot be sure that the flights may be regarded as state flights or diplomatic 
flights. Taking into the consideration that Estonian Aviation Act has a narrow definition for 
state flights. The Special Flight Squadron is one of the best examples. It is a state-owned flight 
detachment used to provide air transport for several state institutions not considered strictly 
state flight worthy.133  
 
Furthermore, at least two aircraft committing an airspace violation were described as just 
belonging to Russian Federation. Every aircraft used or owned by a State cannot be regarded 
as a state aircraft conclusively; therefore, further investigation is needed for both situations. It 
points again in the direction of the narrow state aircraft definition in the Estonian Aviation 
Act. Still, there must have been a valid reason why these flights were regarded as airspace 
violations. Due to these incidents being resolved by diplomatic means, it is difficult to 
ascertain which reasoning the decisions were made. 
 
Interestingly, the number of violations is relatively low compared to the volume of Russian 
military air traffic traversing the area yearly. Therefore, there must be a reason why most of 
the pilots are able to avoid penetrating Estonian airspace. The aspect falls out of the purpose 
of this thesis, but for clarity, it should be further investigated. 
 
Conclusively, every Estonian airspace violation is similar, but not all are equal. Vaindloo 
island region (the corner) may be regarded as a problem area for Estonia and its airspace 
sovereignty. Not all facts about the cases are publicly known or discussed, especially certain 
characteristics about the aircraft, e.g. callsigns, specific routing, etc. Therefore, the solution 
                                                 




does not seem apparent and easily achievable. It would acquire more consultations with the 
appropriate agencies and a more comprehensive approach to its challenges.  
 
As of 2021, only one violation has occurred, but it most surely will not be the last one. In 
recent news, there have been talks regarding a meeting between US President J. Biden and 
Russian President V. Putin, which may take place yet again in Helsinki.134 The author of this 
thesis predicts that the meeting or the preparation for it will result in further incursions into 
Estonian airspace by Russian state aircraft. 
  
                                                 









Territorial violations, which include airspace violations, are criminalised in Finnish penal law. 
Similarly to Estonia, Finland also has concerns about foreign military flight near its borders 
and transgressions of their airspace by different State actors. It gives an opportunity to 
comparatively analyse the challenges and purpose of criminalisation regarding two States with 
varying approaches to the same problem.  To achieve a comprehensive understanding of 
criminalising these kinds of incidents, the legal framework in the Finnish legislature and the 
background of the criminalisation is analysed in the following subchapter. 
 
3.1. The criminalisation of territorial violations in Finnish law 
 
The legal basis of Finnish regulation on territorial control135 is the Territorial Surveillance Act 
implemented in 2000 (Act No. 755/2000). Definition of a governmental aircraft136 is provided 
in section 2 of the former Act. It is defined as "a military, frontier guard, police, or customs 
aircraft or an aircraft used by a State for transport, courier, survey or other corresponding 
flights.”137 Furthermore, a military aircraft is defined as "an aircraft bearing national military 
markings and belonging to national armed forces".138  
 
Chapter 2 of the Territorial Surveillance Act regulates the entry into and stay in Finland by 
military personnel, vehicles, governmental aircraft, and governmental vessels. Thus, 
restrictions apply in principle both for military aircraft and governmental aircraft.139 Section 5 
of said Act purports that a foreign State's governmental aircraft “may enter Finnish territory 
and stay in the country only under the terms of an international treaty binding on Finland or 
the basis of permission.”140 The former has two exceptions. Firstly, a governmental aircraft 
“carrying the head of a foreign State making an official visit to Finland may enter and stay in 
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139 Åkermark et al, op. cit., p. 146. 
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Finnish territory without the beforementioned permission.” The advance notification still must 
be made to the Defence Staff on the entry and stay of the aircraft in Finland.141 Secondly, at 
the request of a territorial surveillance authority or another authority, a governmental aircraft 
“of a foreign State may enter Finnish territory for an urgent rescue mission” or a mission to 
prevent environmental damage or provide assistance in winter navigation.142 Before a 
governmental aircraft enter Finnish territory, a flight plan compliable with Finnish aviation 
regulation and related to the aircraft must be submitted to the area control centre (ACC).143  
 
Further details for supplementing and clarifying the provisions of the Territorial Surveillance 
Act are written in the Territorial Surveillance Government Decree.144 Conditions included in 
the decree relate to the entry and stay of military persons, military vehicles, governmental 
aircraft, and governmental vessels in Finland. The exploration and survey of the sea bottom, 
soil exploration, and aerial photography from an aircraft, permits related to restricted areas, 
operation of territorial surveillance authority in a water area. The activity of a territorial 
surveillance authority while the object of surveillance is in Finnish airspace, land activities of 
territorial surveillance authority, warning and an intensified warning, and other miscellaneous 
provisions.145 The application for a permit for the entry of government aircraft into Finnish 
territory must be submitted to the Defence Staff in good time and no later than six working 
days before the planned entry.146 A permit application related to a government aircraft shall 
contain the necessary information for the decision, such as the State applying the permit, the 
purpose of the visit, the routes to be taken and sites to be visited, the planned times of arrival 
and departure, the planned ports of entry and departure, the arms carried by the military person, 
information on the aircraft entering the country, any special equipment carried by it and the 
crew of the aircraft.147  
 
The Decree purports that an unidentified aircraft entering Finnish territory shall be considered 
a military aircraft until identified otherwise, and all unidentified unmanned aircraft shall be 
considered military aircraft.148 If a governmental aircraft crosses the Finnish border without 
                                                 
141 Ibidem, Section 5 (2). 
142 Ibidem, Section 5 (3). 
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permission, the territorial surveillance authority must admonish the aircraft and urge it to leave 
Finnish territory.149 Initially, this may be done by calling out the aircraft by radio and 
informing its pilot about illegal crossing to Finnish territory. Later, if the aircraft, even after a 
warning or an intensified warning, fails to comply with the order to leave, it shall be forced to 
land or leave Finnish territory, using force if necessary.150 Military intervention may only be 
performed by interception aircraft, very similarly to Baltic Air Policing assets. Using force is 
an option, but it is highly doubtful that it would be done without any previous engagement. If 
the government aircraft is forced to land, the inspection of it shall be decided by the Ministry 
of Defence.151 
 
Defending the State is usually understood to be conducted primarily by the military. Still, the 
Finnish legislator also wanted to indicate the blameworthiness of territorial violations with a 
civil criminalisation.152 In Finland, territorial violations have been criminalised in Chapter 17, 
Section 7c of the Criminal Code,153 stating that a soldier of a foreign State or the master of a 
foreign vessel or state aircraft can be guilty of a territorial violation. From the criminal 
normative perspective, only a State actor may be guilty of a territorial violation. Conceptually 
and normatively, territorial violations should be separated from a state border offence, of 
which anyone may be guilty if they cross the border of Finland without permission.154 
Territorial violations are criminalised as a typical blank penal provision, where the description 
of the punishable act is separated from the threat of punishment. Hence, a territorial violation 
is criminalised in the Criminal Code, and the description of the punishable act is defined in 
Territorial Surveillance Act.155 The criminalisation was included in the Criminal Code 
relevantly recently connected with adopting the Territorial Surveillance Act in 2000. In 
principle, it can be seen as a symbolic criminal law provision. It was considered that parties 
operating in the name of a foreign State are not obliged to subordinate themselves to the 
criminal law measures of another State. During peace-time, serious territorial violations are 
solved with diplomacy. It is especially true in cases of recurrent military territorial violations, 
such as state-conducted violations of airspace.156 
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Interestedly, in 2017 the statutory definition of territorial violations was reformed. Activities 
of so-called unidentified soldiers are criminalised if they enter or stay in Finnish territory in 
violation of the Territorial Surveillance Act. The reform was justified by the Ukraine events, 
and unidentified soldiers were seen as a new type of threat. 157 A new clause was added in the 
Territorial Surveillance Act, whereas an unknown military group or its member may not enter 
the Finnish territory or stay in the country. A similar clause was introduced in the Criminal 
Code, meaning that the activities of unidentified soldiers that violate the Territorial 
Surveillance Act are punishable.158 Comparably to the overall criminalisation, the amendment 
is understood as symbolic rather than functional.159 
 
The authority of conducting preliminary investigations of reported violations of territorial 
integrity is a responsibility of the Border Guard. Still, leadership and coordination under the 
Territorial Surveillance Act are in the hands of the Ministry of Defence.160 The Ministry of 
Defence also has the authority to issue press releases about a suspected territorial violation, 
and it was decided already in 2005 that all alleged violations would be reported.161  
 
The symbolic nature of the criminalisation is also evident in Section 7c (3) of Chapter 17 of 
the Criminal Code. According to which in dealing with territorial violations cases, the 
prosecutor “may waive punishment if the territorial violation has been immediately interrupted 
or if the offender has for that reason been refused entry or deported.”162 This clause underlines 
the legislator’s wish to mitigate practices to address territorial violations with criminal law 
measures, but the reactions should be politically assessed.163 Furthermore, according to 
Section 10 of Chapter 3 of the Criminal Investigation Act164, the public prosecutor may also 
decide, on the request of the head investigator, that no criminal investigation is to be conducted 
or that the criminal investigation shall be discontinued if he or she should wave prosecution 
based on a territorial violation. Nevertheless, the added requirement is that there is no critical 
public or private interest that would require the bringing of charges. 
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Other reasons the criminal investigation may be waived or an already initiated investigation 
may be discontinued based on process economy.165 These include cases of offences for which 
the maximum punishment expected is a fine and which are to be deemed manifestly petty.166 
As a fine or a maximum of one year of imprisonment can be sentenced for a territorial 
violation, there is a chance that criminal investigation in light of territorial violation cases may 
be discontinued on the basis that only a fine would be expected for the violation.167 Criminal 
investigations may also be terminated on the grounds of rationality.168 Practically this means 
that criminal investigation may be discontinued in territorial violation cases if the expense of 
continuing the investigation would be disproportionate to the nature of the matter under 
investigation and if there is no vital public or private interest that would require continuation 
of the investigation.169 
 
Regarding general principles of criminal responsibility, territorial violations have several 
challenges. Firstly, territorial violation requires intent; hence a state aircraft pilot that enters 
Finnish territory only out of negligence or even by mistake cannot be guilty of a criminal 
offence. It may be almost impossible to prove in practice that a person who violated Finnish 
airspace did it deliberately, not out of negligence. The person committing the offence can be 
rarely identified or ensured to be available for a criminal investigation in Finland.170 Secondly, 
concerning military personnel, their liability for territorial violations may be challenged by the 
notion of hierarchical commands. The pilot of a state aircraft (the perpetrator of the offence) 
may be complying with the hierarchical command of his/her superior. The Finnish criminal 
law system does not generally acknowledge the unlawful order of a superior as legal 
justification, but complying with superior order does not generally lead to criminal liability in 
military organisations. Therefore, it may be problematic in light of central principles of 
criminal law if, in territorial violations, the criminal liability would only target the performing 
party.171 Thirdly, a territorial violation may be excused for several types of errors, e.g. person 
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accused of a territorial violation may evade criminal liability due to mistake as to the 
lawfulness of the act.172 
 
Territorial violation as include in the Finnish Criminal Code is deemed as an extraordinary 
statutory definition. Firstly, territorial violation criminalisation has been valid for almost 20 
years. Still, there are no known cases where anybody has been sentenced for a territorial 
violation, even though they regularly occur. Only preliminary investigations are conducted, 
but these investigations cannot be regarded as useless. The symbolic nature of the offence is 
based because the possible issuing of a punishment does not have a general preventive effect 
and that the penal scale of a territorial violation is relatively light.173 Even though it may be 
considered symbolic, the criminalisation of territorial violations has several positive sides. 
Criminalisation gives the Finnish authorities the tools to actively pursue border control and to 
monitor the needs and shortfalls of its territorial surveillance, and at the same time, keeps the 
avenue open for diplomatic means.174  
 
3.2. Existing Estonian regulation relating to airspace violations 
 
The Estonian Penal Code uses a finalistic three-way structure of an offence.175 The basis of 
punishment in the Estonian Penal Code purports that a person shall be punished for an act if it 
comprises the necessary elements of an offence. It is unlawful, and the person is guilty of the 
commission of the offence.176 Furthermore, the penal law of Estonia applies to acts committed 
within the territory of Estonia.177 Offences are categorized into two groups: criminal offences 
and misdemeanours.178 The difference between the two categories is regulated by the extent 
of the punishment, which mirrors the severity of the offence. The Penal Code is the only Act 
in which the necessary elements of a criminal offence are included.179 
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For safeguarding the state border, the Estonian legislature includes several offences. The 
criminal offences can be found in the Penal Code, and other misdemeanours are included in 
other Acts, in this case, the State Border Act, Chapter 21.  
 
The fundamental offences regarding this thesis are found in the State Border Act. The first 
offence relates to the violation of the border regime that is punishable by a fine of up to 200 
fine units.180 The second offence of interest is the illegal crossing of the state border or 
temporary control line of the Republic of Estonia, which is punishable by a fine of up to 200 
units or detention.181 Both of these offences are misdemeanours, therefore less important 
offences in the eyes of the law. The second offence can be perpetrated by crossing the land 
border only; consequently, it cannot apply to aircraft. The first offence looks more closely at 
the border regime that is further depicted in a Regulation of the Government of the Republic.182 
It shall specify the procedure for aircraft to enter the Estonian airspace and move in and exit 
the airspace.183 Point 9 of the Regulation further dwells on the process by which the agency 
monitors aircraft in the national airspace (the ATC services) and on which grounds the Police 
and Border Guard Board (the police) is notified by a violation of the border regime by an 
aircraft. It includes situations where an aircraft violates the procedure for crossing the state 
border.184 The crossing of the state border has not deemed a violation of the border regime if 
the aircraft crosses the border due to technical failure of the aircraft, an emergency, a natural 
disaster or another urgent situation.185 The necessary elements of this offence can be fulfilled 
by a state aircraft to whom it is obligatory to have a permit or a clearance for entry into 
Estonian national airspace that does not possess it. 
 
Criminal offences regarding the illegal crossing of the Estonian state border are in the Penal 
Code. Coincidently there are also two offences named that have any interest in the topic at 
hand. The first is situated in the Penal Code Chapter 15, which regard crimes against the State 
itself. Inside Division 3 of Chapter 15 is the offence of malicious entry into the Republic of 
Estonia.186 The purpose of the criminalisation of this act is to protect the legal right of Estonian 
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internal and external security.187 The maliciousness part of the offence is described in its 
elements: when the illegal crossing of the state border is committed to conceal another criminal 
offence against the State in the Republic of Estonia.188 The perpetrator must be an alien; 
therefore, the necessary elements of the offence can only be fulfilled by a foreign citizen. It 
cannot be ruled out that malicious entry into the Republic of Estonia can include aircraft use. 
Still, due to the offence's necessary elements, it is also modelled more for crossing a physical 
border area. Therefore, state aircraft entering the national airspace unlawfully cannot fulfil it 
by definition without committing other necessary elements depicted in the offence. 
 
A more interesting offence can be found in Penal Code Division 1 of Chapter 16 under 
offences against public peace and public security. It is the illegal crossing of the state border 
or temporary line of the Republic of Estonia.189 It punishes unlawful crossing of the state 
border or temporary line if the act does not contain the necessary elements of an offence 
provided in § 2374 of the Penal Code. One of the necessary elements of the offence is that the 
illegal crossing occurs using transportation in a location not intended for crossing.190 
Principally the wording of the offence includes entry into the national airspace, and an aircraft 
is by design a mean of transportation. What makes this offence problematic for aircraft is the 
aspect of the location of the intended crossing. Aircraft do not enter national airspace through 
physical locations, but they fly through navigational corridors and points provided by 
aeronautical publications. Moreover, the flight path of an aircraft can be changed by air traffic 
controllers following operational need and regards for safety. State aircraft may also have no 
predetermined flight path, and these are more dependent on operational impact.  
 
Territorial violations by state aircraft (airspace violations) are not currently criminalised in 
Estonia. The offences found in the State Borders Act and the Penal Code do not specifically 
target aircraft. The most applicable offence provided in the State Borders Act is a 
misdemeanour and therefore not a criminal offence.  
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3.3. The possibility to criminalise airspace violations in Estonian criminal law 
 
Criminalisation is the process of creating a crime (a criminal offence) and making conduct 
previously lawful illegal, frequently for the protection of society. However, the goal might 
also be one such as economic regulation.191 Criminalising airspace violations is not currently 
under consideration in Estonia, and there are no public investigations into these incidents. 
They are regarded as a diplomatic matter and solved behind closed doors. It results in no public 
awareness of these incidents, and it downplays their significance. 
 
When looking at the reasoning behind the Finnish regulation and the aspect of criminalising 
these kinds of incursion, it is regarded as symbolic, not functional. Nevertheless, 
criminalisation is not considered to be unnecessary.  The following two subchapters will look 
more closely at the provisions and general principles in Estonian criminal law that may prove 
challenging to criminalise airspace violations.  
 
3.3.1. Challenges for criminalisation related to criminal proceedings 
 
Several points of interest can hinder the criminalisation of territorial violations by state aircraft 
regarding the criminal procedure. Challenges arise connected with the investigative bodies, 
the legality principle, the gathering of the evidence, and the termination of criminal 
proceedings for various reasons. 
 
The Defence Forces is the competent governmental authority for protecting and guarding the 
Estonian national airspace. As the function lies in the hands of the Defence Forces, it would 
be logical that it would also investigate the offence in its competence. Therefore, it is 
imperative to ascertain which investigative body would conduct the investigation. An 
investigative body is defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure1 § 31. It is a public institution 
that performs an investigative authority directly or through an institution administrated by 
them or through a local office.192 In this closed list are the Police and Border Guard Board, the 
Internal Security Service, the Tax and Customs Board, the Competition Board, the Military 
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Police, the Environmental Board, the Department of Prisons of the Ministry of Justice, and the 
prisons. An investigative body shall perform the procedural acts independently unless the 
permission of a court or the permission or order of the Prosecutor’s Office is necessary for the 
performance of the act.193  
 
During the pre-court proceedings, an investigative body and the Prosecutor’s Office shall 
ascertain the fact vindicating or accusing the suspect or accused.194 Investigative bodies 
conduct these proceedings to the limit of their investigative jurisdiction. Most of the criminal 
offences lie in the investigative jurisdiction of the Police and Border Guard Board and the 
Internal Security Police.195 Criminal offences under the investigative jurisdiction of other 
investigative bodies must be named explicitly in the Code of Criminal Procedure.196 
 
Military Police is the only investigative body in the Defence Forces. It has the right to conduct 
pre-court proceedings in criminal offences related to service in the Defence Forces and war 
crimes.197 Criminal offences related to service in the Defence Forces are a separate part of the 
Penal Code and are provided in Chapter 24. These include, for example, desertion (§ 439), 
failure to obey orders (§ 433), and violation of requirements for navigation of vessels (§ 443). 
The commission of these offences by a person is punishable only if the person is serving in 
the Defence Forces.198 War crimes are provided in Chapter 8 Division 4 of the Penal Code and 
include, for example, such offences as attacks against civilians (§ 97), use of human shields 
(§1022), and marauding (§ 109).  
 
These criminal offences are limited to a specific area of criminal law that is closely related to 
military actions or service in the Defence Forces. Therefore, it does not investigate other 
criminal offences and does not have the capacity or competence to conduct investigations into 
them. In the case of conducting investigations related to territorial violations, the investigative 
jurisdiction of the Military Police would have to be extended and the required competencies 
acquired. Territorial violation by state aircraft would not be a common offence occurring daily, 
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but their frequency can be measured in an annual timeline. Hence, the capacity of 
investigations would low, and they could be conducted in a specialized manner.  
 
The extension of the competence of the Military Police to investigate territorial violations 
would contrast with the current regulation, where the Police and Border Guard Board is 
responsible for the organisation of matters in the area of the border guard.199 Police 
traditionally have more capacity and experience for conducting investigations. Most of the 
criminal offences are investigated by the police, and it is one of their primary functions.200 
Territorial violations are not limited to aircraft but should include personnel and vessels. It 
would create a possibility for parallel investigation, and the lines of competence would become 
unclear. Consequently, it would be a political decision which investigative body would have 
the investigative jurisdiction to conduct the criminal proceedings for territorial violations. 
 
Estonia has mandatory criminal proceedings. The investigative bodies and the Prosecutor’s 
Office are required to conduct criminal proceedings upon the appearance of fact referring to a 
criminal offence unless the circumstances preclude criminal proceedings or unless grounds to 
terminate criminal proceedings exist.201 The existing legality principles purport that criminal 
proceedings must be started and conducted when it is apparent that facts referring to an offence 
exist. The commencement of criminal proceedings is independent of the opinion of other 
governmental agencies and, for example, the victim.202 Exemptions to this rule are depicted in 
Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings.203 These exemptions include, for example, 
when no grounds for criminal proceedings are present, the limitation period for the criminal 
offence has expired, an amnesty precludes imposition of a punishment, and the suspect or 
accused is dead. Unlike the Finnish regulation for territorial violations where “the prosecutor 
may waive prosecution, or the court may waive punishment if the territorial violation has been 
immediately interrupted or if the offender has for that reason been refused entry or deported,” 
no such ground exists in Estonian regulation. In the case of Estonian national airspace 
violations, where penetration of the airspace is minimal in depth and duration, these 
circumstances would not exempt from the commencement of criminal proceedings. Every 
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airspace violation must be investigated and appropriately concluded. In the current situation, 
whereas these violations by state aircraft are handled through diplomatic means, leaving a 
wide range for discretion would be a step in the other direction. Consideration must be made 
whether it would be a positive or negative development. 
 
The detection of a territorial violation by a state aircraft is in the competence of the Defence 
Forces; thus, the report of a criminal offence must also be submitted to an investigative body 
by the Defence Forces. It must be pointed out that the Defence Forces is not mandated to 
submit this report as it is not an investigative body itself. Therefore, an internal regulation 
system must be drafted to require the necessary units to submit the information. 
 
Whilst conducting criminal proceedings, the facts relating to the subject of proof are the time, 
place and manner of commission of the criminal offence. Other facts relating to the criminal 
offence. The necessary elements of the criminal offence. The quilt of the person who 
committed the criminal offence. The information describing the person who committed the 
criminal offence and other circumstances affecting the person's liability.204 The subject of 
proof is the set of characteristics and connections of a criminal offence under investigation 
that must be identified for the possibility of a guilty verdict.205 Evidence includes the 
statements of the suspect, the accused, the victim, the testimony of a witness, an expert’s 
report, the statements given by an expert upon provision of explanations concerning the 
expert’s report. Also, physical evidence reports on investigative activities, minutes of court 
sessions, reports, or video recordings on surveillance activities, and other documents, 
photographs, films or other data recordings.206 Other evidence may also be used to prove the 
facts relating to criminal proceedings, except if the evidence has been obtained by a criminal 
offence or violation of a fundamental right.207 
 
Facts relating to the time, place, and manner of commission of a territorial violation by a state 
aircraft are not overly troublesome, as air surveillance is conducted and the data recorded 
daily. The problem with this data as evidence is the fact that information collected from the 
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radar information and surveillance systems of the Defence Forces is a state secret.208 The 
comprehensive radar information collected and processed by an air surveillance system is 
classified as confidential for five years.209 It, of course, does not prohibit investigations by 
itself. Still, it complicates matters when conducting criminal proceedings, especially when the 
classified information is the primary evidence against a foreign citizen as state aircraft pilots 
usually are. 
 
When a criminal offence is committed, there must be a perpetrator who can be identified as 
the suspect in pre-court proceedings. The perpetrator of an airspace violation is commonly the 
pilot having factual control of the aircraft. Identifying the suspect is the most challenging part 
of criminal proceedings when looking at airspace violations by state aircraft. There is also the 
issue of obtaining information on the suspect's whereabouts, but that can be done by relevant 
means if necessary.  
 
First, the suspect must be identified. It is not a simple task when regarding aircraft that overfly 
the State territory. Especially when the aircraft did not file any application for entry into 
Estonian airspace, in theory, this information can be obtained by a formal request from the 
State to whom the aircraft belongs. The State usually has an overview of their personnel and 
their activities regarding their state aircraft. The difficulty lies in the fact that States typically 
do not want to provide this information, even more, when dealing with military personnel, 
regardless of how good relationships are between the States. The same problem is pointed out 
in the article by Finnish researchers. The American embassy refused to disclose information 
concerning a crew of a state aircraft that allegedly violated the demilitarized zone of the Åland 
Islands regarding US Defence Ministry policies.210 It may be a severe obstacle for conducting 
criminal proceedings.  
 
Furthermore, Section 2001 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the possibility of 
termination of criminal proceedings based on the impossibility to identify the person who 
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committed the criminal offence. This termination can be found on the order of the investigative 
body with the permission of the Prosecutor’s Office or by order of the Prosecutor’s Office.211 
 
This modus of termination has the precondition that it is impossible to collect additional 
evidence, or the collection thereof is not reasonable.212 It must be assessed on every case 
separately. Firstly, have the investigative bodies conducted the necessary and most used 
procedural acts related to the specific criminal offence. Secondly, is it possible to perform 
further procedural actions relating to the facts of a particular case? Finally, is it reasonable to 
conduct further procedural acts regarding their chance of success and resources spent?213 
Essentially it is a discretional decision, but it must be substantiated in a written order and must 
usually include the reasons for the decision.214 In cases of airspace violations, this would be 
the most used basis of termination of criminal proceedings.  
 
The legality principle is, to a certain extent, countered by the opportunity principle. This 
principle allows termination of criminal proceedings for various reasons depicted in several 
Code of Criminal Procedure sections.215 The main reasoning behind the principle is procedural 
economics. A State has limited resources for conducting criminal proceedings and should 
concentrate more on serious offences. Furthermore, terminating criminal proceedings on the 
ground of opportunity decreases the workload of the court system and speeds up other more 
essential proceedings.216  
 
This principle is most regularly used to terminate criminal proceedings in case of lack of public 
interest in proceedings and negligible quilt.217 Several mandatory aspects must be fulfilled 
before termination is possible. The object of the criminal proceedings must be a criminal 
offence in the second degree; furthermore, the quilt of the offender must be negligible. The 
offender must have had remedied the damage caused by the criminal offence or at least have 
had commenced doing it. The offender must have had paid the expenses relating to criminal 
proceedings or have assumed the obligation to pay such costs. There is no public interest in 
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the continuation of the proceedings.218 The negligible quilt may be of interest concerning 
airspace violations which is further analysed in the following subchapter. Still, overall, the 
most often used section for opportunity could not be used to terminate criminal proceedings 
for airspace violations foremost due to the public interest aspect that must be fulfilled. Tough 
public interest has a relevantly broad definition in Estonian criminal law; it may be ascertained 
that national security matters always have public interest. Therefore, like in the Finnish 
legislature, there should be a different way to terminate such criminal proceedings. 
 
Another opportunity for terminating criminal proceedings relevant to airspace violations can 
be found in section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The section stipulates that the 
Prosecutor’s Office may terminate criminal proceedings by an order if the criminal offence 
was committed by a foreign citizen on board a foreign ship or aircraft located in the territory 
of the Republic of Estonia.219 It regulates situations where there is a competition between 
Estonia’s and another State’s criminal procedural competence. The other States may have 
more interest or opportunity to conduct an adequate investigation.220 If a criminal offence is 
committed on board a foreign aircraft, it probably will not be reasonable to conduct the 
investigation in Estonia. The main reason being that aircraft are usually inside Estonian 
territory for a short period. The legality principle would still apply, and this reasoning may 
only apply to the termination of criminal proceedings.221  
 
In most cases, the offender for an airspace violation is the aircraft's pilot, and therefore this 
means for termination can surely apply. Contrastingly, from the wording of the section, it may 
be deduced that it is not meant for such offences and relates to more common offences 
committed on board an aircraft or a vessel, e.g. assault, theft etc. Additionally, it is hard to 
imagine that a foreign State would have any interest to prosecute or even formally investigate 
Estonian airspace violations committed by their citizens, let alone by military personnel. 
 
Challenges that the criminalisation of territorial violations would have for Estonian criminal 
procedure are highly comparable to the Finnish regulation. The result may also be somewhat 
disappointing, as punishing or even identifying the perpetrator of this kind of offence may be 
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impossible. Before criminalising these offences, it must be considered which investigative 
body would conduct the criminal proceedings. Protecting and guarding the airspace is a 
function performed by the Defence Forces, but it has a relevantly low capacity for conducting 
such investigations as a military organisation. Additionally, radar data collected of these 
violations is a state secret, which does complicate the investigation, but relevant measures may 
be employed. The beforementioned challenges are not related to the commencement of the 
criminal proceedings, and the legality principle does have some positive aspects worth 
discussing. Commencing and conducting investigations into airspace violations allows 
acknowledging the importance of these violations and further analyse the applicable national 
and international regulation. The criminal proceedings conducted in cases of airspace 
violations may be terminated for several reasons. Firstly, it may be terminated due to the 
impossibility of identifying the perpetrator. Secondly, the opportunity principle may be 
applicable if it is ascertained that there is no relevant public interest in the offence. It may be 
possible for minor incursions into Estonian airspace. Overall, the challenges relating to 
criminal procedure for the criminalisation of territorial or airspace violations are not 
impossible to overcome. Still, several issues remain and must be taken into consideration in 
the process of criminalisation. Territorial violation would be an extraordinary criminal offence 
in terms of criminal proceedings. 
 
3.3.2. Challenges for criminalisation related to the General Provision of the Penal Code  
 
Regarding general provision found in the Penal Code, some must be considered troublesome 
for the criminalisation of territorial violations by foreign state aircraft. Foremost the issue of 
criminal responsibility is discussed in the following subchapter. Additionally, it takes a closer 
look at hierarchical commands that are strongly connected with the military and whether it 
would be reasonable to punish only the actor in these incidents.  
 
Necessary elements of offence include objective elements and subjective elements. Objective 
elements necessary to constitute an offence are acts or omissions described by law. In cases 
where it is required, consequences in a causal relation to them must be regarded.222 Subjective 
elements of an offence are intent or negligence.223 As airspace violations are not currently 
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criminalised, the necessary objective elements of an offence do not exist and have little 
importance as a hypothetical issue. In the author’s view, the objective elements would strongly 
resemble the Finnish regulation. Nevertheless, the more prevailing are the subjective elements 
necessary to constitute an offence. 
 
For most criminal offences, intent is required as a subjective element of the offence; as usual, 
only intentional acts are punishable as criminal offences. Negligent actions are punishable 
only when it is clearly stated in the Penal Code.224 Furthermore, the Penal Code provides an 
additional exemption from intentional acts, a person who at the time of the commission of an 
act is unaware that the circumstance which constitutes a necessary element of an offence is 
not deemed to have committed the act intentionally.225 This person shall be punished for a 
crime committed through negligence if the Penal Code provides such an offence.226 In 
territorial violations, intent should be mandatory as a subjective element of an offence, and at 
least indirect intent must be present.227 A problem arises from differentiating between 
negligence and intent. For airspace violations, it would be difficult to find out whether the 
offence was committed intentionally because most known violations are relevantly brief both 
in time and depth. Taking into further consideration the unique circumstances that are present 
in the Vaindloo area. Perpetrator’s intentions may be complicated to ascertain where the 
person committing the offence cannot be identified.   
 
Only unlawful acts are punished under the Penal Code. Unlawfulness is presumed and must 
be precluded by the Penal Code, another Act, international convention, or international 
treaty.228 Unlawfulness may be precluded on account of an error made by the perpetrator.229 
There are several reasons and situations where a foreign state aircraft pilot may be in error 
regarding the unlawfulness of his/her actions. Firstly, the flight path for the aircraft is usually 
given by a relevant air traffic control agency or at least may be changed by it if necessary. 
Whilst flying the given route, the pilot may be unaware of its unlawfulness due to erroneous 
or unclear instructions. Secondly, it would be unreasonable to expect the pilot to know the 
exact content of the statutory definition of a territorial violation.230 
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Relating to military personnel, in Estonian penal law, unlawfulness may be precluded by a 
hierarchical command or order.231 In Estonian legislation, an order is a communication, 
written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions of a commander.232 Furthermore, the 
recipient of an order is required to comply with the received orders without argument233 and 
refusal or failure to obey orders are criminal offences in some circumstances.234 The regulation 
on orders includes two types of unlawful orders. Firstly, an order is void if the order requires 
the commission of an offence. A void order shall not be issued and complied with.235 Secondly, 
an order which conflicts with the law is a prohibited order. Contrary to the void order, 
prohibited orders must be adhered to.236  
 
Liability for consequences of compliance with the order is generally with the issuer of an 
order.237 For void orders that require the commission of an offence, both the issuer of the order 
and the person who complies with the order are liable for the consequences of compliance 
with the void order.238 The commander who issues a void or a prohibited order shall face 
disciplinary proceedings or even criminal charges.239 According to Penal Code § 446, abuse 
of authority is punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Offence in terms of a void order 
must be considered as the definition given in Penal Code § 3 and therefore includes both 
criminal offences and misdemeanours. In conclusion, the hierarchical command that orders 
the pilot to commit a territorial violation is in principle void in Estonia. According to Estonian 
regulation, both the pilot and the issuer of the order may be liable for compliance with the 
order if the act itself is unlawful. 
 
Conclusively, the perpetrator's criminal liability of an airspace violation may be arguable due 
to primary challenges to the intentionality of the offence and errors in the unlawfulness of the 
act. Nevertheless, these aspects are concerned only with punishing the perpetrator, which may 
not be the only purpose of the novel legislature. Regardless, the challenges that face 
                                                 
231 Sootak, op. cit., p. 128. 
232 Estonian Defence Forces Organization Act, § 29 (1). 
233 Ibidem, § 29 (7). 
234 Estonian Penal Code, § 432. Refusal to obey orders; § 433. Failure to obey orders. 
235 Estonian Defence Forces Organization Act, § 33  
236 Ibidem, § 34 
237 Ibidem, § 35 (1) 
238 Ibidem, § 35 (2) 
239 Ibidem, § 35 (4) 
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criminalisation of airspace violations related to the Penal Code's general provisions must not 
be discarded and overlooked.  They are an obstacle to criminalisation but do not hinder its 
possibility. The latter is more strongly connected with the purpose of criminalisation. 
Regarding airspace violations, the possibility to punish the perpetrator must not be seen as the 









The primary purpose of this study was to find out on which grounds it would be possible to 
criminalise territorial violations by foreign state aircraft in the Estonian criminal law and 
whether criminalisation would be an effective way to deter these kinds of violations, and what 
purpose would it serve. Currently, violations of Estonian airspace are dealt with via diplomatic 
means and investigations are performed behind closed doors. According to public sources, 
Estonian airspace violations occur yearly, and almost all of them happen in the vicinity of 
Vaindloo island. According to the Estonian Defence Forces, the violations have been 
committed solely by the Russian Federation state aircraft. Even though the number of serious 
violations has been decreasing in recent years, their overall volume remains the same. 
 
 
Civil aviation is regulated by the Chicago Convention, which explicitly excludes state aircraft 
from its scope. Nevertheless, several conclusions may be derived from it. One of the pillars of 
the Chicago Convention is the sovereignty principle. The contracting States recognize that 
every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace over their territory. The 
Chicago Convention does not establish freedom of overflight, and under customary 
international law, every flight over foreign territory is subject to the consent of the State 
overflown. For state aircraft, this rule is especially prevailing as no state aircraft of the 
contracting State may fly over the territory of any State without authorization by special 
agreement or otherwise. For international straits defined in UNCLOS Art. 37, the regime of 
transit passage is applicable to state aircraft. Furthermore, state aircraft exercising the right of 
transit passage does not have to comply with ICAO’s Rules of the Air. The State governs the 
entry rules into the national airspace, and international law provides only limited possibilities 
for freedom of overflight. 
 
To enter Estonian airspace, state aircraft must apply for a permit from the Ministry of Defence. 
The application process is confidential, and the applying party is given only the result of the 
application. For the European Union and NATO members, yearly permits are provided 
automatically, which gives the right to enter Estonian airspace without prior notification, 
except for aircraft fitted with intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, or 
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electronic warfare equipment. Additionally, a permit is needed for flight with diplomatic 
importance, which also applies to civil aircraft. The procedure for granting permits is based 
on the goodwill of the applying party, and it may be almost impossible to police by national 
law enforcement agencies. 
 
Defining state aircraft in international law is not an easy task as no universally accepted 
definition exists. The first attempt to define state aircraft was made in the Paris Convention of 
1919, whereas state aircraft are military aircraft and other aircraft exclusively employed in 
State service. This definition was challenged by the adaption of the Versailles Peace Treaty 
when the Allies tried to confiscate German aeronautical equipment, which they deemed 
military aircraft. At the same time, Germany regarded them as civil aircraft. It was attempted 
to define military aircraft by technical parameters, but that proved to be futile. The Chicago 
Convention Art. 3 (b) wording on the matter leans in favour of a functional approach of 
defining state aircraft, as it deems aircraft used in military, customs, and police services as 
state aircraft. It cannot be regarded as an all-comprehensive list of functions state aircraft may 
perform.  
 
Furthermore, aircraft may be of dual-use, and the determination of whether an aircraft is a 
state aircraft remains on a case-by-case basis. The definition of state aircraft found in the 
Estonian Aviation Act is narrower than the assumption in the Chicago Convention; it remains 
unclear whether it is intentional or a mistake. Its current state does not effectively differentiate 
between civil or state aircraft, limiting the possibility to conduct effective control over 
Estonian national airspace.  
 
From the perspective of the thesis, it was found that Russian state aircraft traversing primarily 
to-and-from Kaliningrad oblast conduct their flight over the high seas or the EEZ of Estonia. 
Russian military aircraft are not keen on applying for permits from the Estonian MOD, and it 
is doubtful that the Estonian authorities would grant permits to these kinds of flights. It may 
be reasoned that Russian aircraft using this route are state aircraft performing a state function 
whatever aircraft is being used. Overall, defining state aircraft is governed by domestic law, 





The Defence Forces carries out its function to protect and guard the Estonian national airspace 
by its armed service, the Air Force and its relevant units. Furthermore, the performance of this 
function may be augmented by armed forces of a State being party to an agreement containing 
the principle of collective self-defence entered into with the Republic of Estonia. The armed 
forces in mind of this notion are the Baltic Air Policing assets deployed in Estonia or Lithuania. 
Their primary duty is to intercept the suspected aircraft for identification and, when necessary, 
to order the aircraft to land in the designated airfield. The Defence Forces may use deadly 
force against aircraft violating Estonian national airspace, but it is highly debatable whether it 
would be proportional in time of peace. Civil aircraft's interception is deemed the last resort 
measure and must be conducted with extensive care to flight safety. Nevertheless, the use of 
deadly force cannot be ruled out in cases of Renegade aircraft, but using force against these 
kinds of platforms must be further regulated by bilateral agreements. It may be ascertained 
that during peace-time, the Defence Forces competence for protecting national airspace is 
limited. 
 
Guarding the national airspace is conducted by the Air Surveillance Wing, especially by CRC 
Tallinn, as part of BALTNET and the relevant NATO command structure. Their first objective 
is to safeguard the sovereignty of Estonian national airspace. It is done by identifying and 
analysing all relevant incidents. Air surveillance is the first line of defence when regarding 
airspace violations. Only military radars can detect airspace violations and aircraft not using 
an operational transponder. 
 
 
Between the years 2017 and 2021, there have been 13 reported violations of Estonian airspace 
in the vicinity of Vaindloo. The main reason the violations occur in the vicinity of Vaindloo 
island is that the air route through the area is not controlled by the air traffic control authority 
of Estonia but the Russian centre in Saint Petersburg. The FIR boundaries are not equal to the 
Estonian state border, and the issue needs further attention. The aircraft violating Estonian 
airspace are usually flying from mainland Russia to Kaliningrad oblast or Finland. Some 
reported airspace violations were committed by aircraft that may not fall in the category of 






In Finnish law, territorial violations are criminalised by the Finnish Criminal Code Section 7c 
of Chapter 17, stating that a soldier of a foreign State or a master of a foreign vessel or state 
aircraft can be guilty of a territorial violation. Only State actors may be guilty of this offence. 
The Finnish Territorial Surveillance Act has a broad definition of governmental aircraft and 
the procedure for dealing with these kinds of incidents. The Act also depicts the procedure for 
governmental aircraft entry into Finnish territory, and criminal liability is connected with 
disregarding the rules set by the Territorial Surveillance Act. The criminalisation of territorial 
violations has to be regarded as symbolic regulations rather than functional, as prosecuting the 
violations may prove to be nearly impossible, which is highlighted in practice. Firstly, 
identifying the perpetrator is difficult as foreign States do not disclose this information to 
Finnish authorities. Secondly, it would be unreasonable to conduct extensive investigations 
into incidents where the possible punishment is relevantly light. Thirdly, the person accused 
of a territorial violation may evade criminal responsibility due to an error regarding the act's 
unlawfulness. 
 
Furthermore, the liability may be challenged by lack of intent by the perpetrator or when the 
offender was acting under a hierarchical command. Regardless of the regulation being almost 
exclusively of symbolic nature, it has been found that there are benefits of the criminalisation 
and the investigations being conducted. It enables the Finnish authorities to pursue border 
control measures actively and monitor its territorial surveillance needs and shortfalls. 
 
 
It was discovered that several challenges face criminalisation that is derived from Estonian 
criminal law. The main difficulties are connected with criminal proceedings and general 
principles of penal law. Challenges in the criminal procedure relate to investigative bodies, 
the legality principle, the gathering of the evidence, and the termination of criminal 
proceedings. The result of criminalisation in the point of view of criminal proceedings may be 
disappointing. Criminal proceedings must be commenced and conducted under the legality 
principle, but these investigations may be terminated due to the difficulties of identifying the 




Furthermore, safeguarding the national airspace is a function performed by the Defence 
Forces, but it has limited capabilities for conducting criminal proceedings. Therefore, the 
investigations must be conducted by the police service with extensive coordination with the 
Air Force. There is no obstacle to criminalising airspace violations in Estonian law, but these 
challenges must be addressed and mitigated. 
 
The deterring effect of criminalisation is not overly visible in the short timeframe. The Russian 
Federation has almost exclusively denied these violations and would not be a helpful 
counterpart for solving the situation. Similarly to the Finnish experience, the actual effect 
would be found in highlighting the incidents and keeping the lines of communication open via 
diplomatic means. Furthermore, it would be an opportunity to discuss the matter as a whole 
and the domestic regulation connected with it. 
 
In conclusion, even though there are several challenges to the criminalisation of airspace 
violations in Estonian law, these challenges may be mitigated. It is assessed that the 
criminalisation is possible and purposeful. It must be regarded that punishing the perpetrators 
should not be the primary objective. Still, the overall increase of public interest and 




VÕÕRRIIKIDE RIIKLIKE ÕHUSÕIDUKITE POOLT SOORITATUD 
TERRITORIAALSETE RIKKUMISTE KRIMINALISEERIMISE 
VÕIMALUS EESTI KARISTUSÕIGUSES. Resümee 
 
 
Õhupiiri rikkumised on tõsine rahvusvaheline intsident, eriti vaadates olukorrale läbi 
kahjustada saanud riigi silmade. Eesti õhupiiri on rikutud aastate jooksul mitmekümneid kordi. 
Kõige tõsisemaks võib pidada sündmust, mis leidis aset 2003. aasta oktoobris, mil kaks 
Venemaa Föderatsiooni hävituslennukit sisenesid Eesti õhuruumi ilma loata ja lendasid 
marsruudil pikkusega üle 200 kilomeetri Hiiumaast kuni Eesti idaosani. Lennu motiiviks on 
peetud luure- või kaitsesüsteemide testimise alast tegevust, marsruudile jäi uus sõjaväe radar 
Kellaveres. Sündmus toimus vähem kui kuus kuud enne Eesti liitumist NATO-ga. Pärast seda 
sündmust pole sellise skaalaga õhupiiri rikkumisi toimunud, kuid neid võib sellegipoolest 
pidada regulaarseteks. 
 
Eesti õhupiir on paika pandud lähtuvalt rahvusvahelise õiguse normidest. Põhiliseks 
lennundust reguleerivaks rahvusvaheliseks konventsiooniks on Rahvusvahelise 
tsiviillennunduse konventsioon (Chicago konventsioon). Selle põhiprobleemiks on fakt, et 
selle regulatsioon kehtib enamjaolt ainult tsiviilõhusõidukitele. 
 
Tsiviilõhusõidukite eristamine riiklikest õhusõidukitest pole lihtne ülesanne. Chicago 
konventsioonist tulenevalt peetakse riiklikeks õhusõidukiteks selliseid õhusõidukeid, mida 
kasutatakse sõjaväe-, tolli- ja politseiteenistuses. Sarnaselt on õhusõidukite kategoriseerimine 
paigas Eesti lennundusseaduses, kuigi sealset regulatsiooni võib pidada kitsamaks. 
 
Ebaseaduslik maismaapiiri ületamine on tavaliselt siseriiklikus õiguses kriminaliseeritud või 
vähemalt karistatav väärteo koosseisudega. Mitmed selletaolised koosseisud on leitavad nii 
karistusseadustikus kui ka asjakohastest muudes seadustes, nt riigipiiri seadus. Kuigi kõik 
õhusõidukid võivad õhupiiri rikkuda, keskendus käesolev magistritöö riiklikele lennukitele. 
Tsiviillennundus on üks kõige enam reguleeritud rahvusvahelise õiguse harusid, kuid vaid 
väike osa sellest kehtib samaväärselt riiklikele õhusõidukitele. Kitsendamaks töö perspektiivi 
veelgi, keskendutakse selles ainult rahuaegsetele protseduurile, jättes kõrvale 




Tulenevalt riigipiiri seadusest, on õhuruumi valvamise ja kaitsmise funktsioon antud 
Kaitseväe pädevusse. Kaitseväe põhifunktsioonideks on tulenevalt kaitseväe korralduse 
seadusest riigi sõjaline kaitse ning selleks valmistumine. See lähtub tavapärasest arusaamast, 
milliseid funktsioone sõjaväelised asutused erinevates riikides täidavad. Õhuruumi valvamine 
ja kaitsmine on seevastu ülesanne, mida tuleb teostada olenemata olukorrast ja ajast. 
 
Õhupiiri rikkumised pole hetkel Eesti õiguses kriminaliseeritud. Selles tulenevalt oli 
magistritöö põhiprobleemiks asjaolu, et taolise rikkumise toimepanijad ei karistata. Taolised 
intsidendid lahendatakse kasutades diplomaatilisi kanaleid ja saladuse kattevarjus. Selles 
tulenevalt oli töö eesmärgiks välja selgitada, millistel alustel on võimalik taolised rikkumised 
Eesti õiguses kriminaliseerida ning millist eesmärki see endas kannaks. 
 
Eesmärgi saavutamiseks tuli vastata mitmetele uurimisküsimustele. Millised õhusõidukid on 
riiklikud õhusõidukid ja kuidas on nende sisenemine Eesti õhuruumi reguleeritud siseriiklikus 
ja rahvusvahelises õiguses? Kuidas Kaitsevägi täidab talle usaldatud funktsiooni valvata ja 
kaitsta Eesti õhuruumi? Millised on kõige tüüpilisemad Eesti õhuruumi rikkumised? Kuidas 
on territoriaalsed rikkumised reguleeritud Soome karistusõiguses? Milliseid väljakutsed 
kaasnevad õhuruumi rikkumiste kriminaliseerimisele Eesti karistusõiguses ning kuidas see 
mõjutaks võimalust rikkumiste toimepanijaid karistada? 
 
Töös on läbivalt kasutatud analüütilist uurimismeetodit, analüüsides õigusraamistikku, mis 
reguleerib riiklikke õhusõidukeid ja õhupiiri rikkumisi. Analüüs on enda sisult doktriiniline, 
sidudes endas rahvusvahelise õiguse norme, mis reguleerivad lennundust ja mereõigust, ning 
siseriiklikku riigikaitse ja kriminaalõigust. Võrdlevat meetodit on kasutatud analüüsimaks, 
kuidas on võimalik rakendada Soome karistusõiguses olevat regulatsiooni Eesti õigusesse, 
millised on selle eesmärgid ja võimalikud kitsaskohad. 
 
Magistritöö põhilisteks allikateks on vastavasisuline rahvusvahelise õiguse allikad, eelkõige 
Chicago konventsioon, ning teadusartiklid ja muud publikatsioonid, mis seda tõlgendavad. 
Õhupiiri rikkumiste statistika on toodud avalikele allikatele tuginedes, kasutades selleks 
erinevaid ajalehe artikleid ja pressiteateid. Töö kolmandas peatükis on kasutatud allikatena 





Töö on jagatud kolmeks peatükiks. Esimene peatükk analüüsib suveräänse õhuruumi 
põhimõtet rahvusvahelises õiguses, riiklike õhusõidukite erinevaid definitsioone ning vaatab 
lähemalt protseduuri, mille läbi on lubatud neil Eesti õhuruumi siseneda. Lisaks sellele 
analüüsitakse Kaitseväe pädevusi Eesti õhuruumi valvamisel ja kaitsmisel ning annab selge 
ülevaate, kuidas selle funktsiooni täitmisele rakendatakse liitlasriikide vahendeid Balti 
õhuturbe missiooni vaatenurgast. Teine peatükk keskendub Eesti õhupiiri rikkumistele ja 
nende võimalikele põhjustele, mis toimuvad eranditult samas geograafilises alas – Vaindloo 
saare lähistel. Kolmas peatükk analüüsib, kuidas ja miks on territoriaalsed rikkumised, sh 
õhupiiri rikkumised, kriminaliseeritud Soome siseriiklikus õiguses, ning selgitab välja, kas ja 
kuidas on võimalik taolised rikkumised kriminaliseerida ka Eesti õiguses. 
 
Riigid naudivad enda õhuruumis täielikku suveräänsust, mille kohaselt ei ole lubatud riiklikel 
õhusõidukitel võõrriigi õhuruumi sisenda ilma vastava loata. Chicago konventsiooni kohaselt 
puudub rahvusvahelises õiguses ülelennuvabadus. Taoline õigus on rakendatav ainult 
avamerel või teatavate piirangutega riikide majandusvööndis. Üheks erandiks on sellele 
takistamatu läbisõiduõigus, mida on võimalik teostada rahvusvaheliseks meresõiduks 
kasutatavates väinades. Üldjuhul on seega üle riigi territooriumi lendamiseks vaja vastava riigi 
luba, mis eriti kehtib riiklikele õhusõidukitele. 
 
Riiklike õhusõidukite eristamine tsiviilkasutuses olevatest õhusõidukitest on valmistanud 
mitmeid probleeme alates lennunduse alguspäevadest. Kõige tuntum definitsioon on toodud 
Chicago konventsioonis, kuid seda võib pidada pigem näitlikuks. Riiklike õhusõidukite 
prevaleerivaks tunnuseks on kujunenud funktsionaalne lähenemine, mis võib sellegipoolest 
olla petlik, sest samu õhusõidukeid on võimalik kasutada mitmete riiklikust tähtsust omavate 
funktsioonide täitmiseks. Venemaa Föderatsiooni õhusõidukite puhul saab üheks peamiseks 
tunnuseks pidada nende käitumismalli lendudel Kaliningradi oblastisse ja tagasi. Nende 
lendude marsruut väldib põhimõtteliselt sisenemist Balti riikide õhuruumi, millest võib 
järeldada, et need õhusõidukid vajaksid ülelennuluba, kui need sooviksid võõrriigi õhuruumi 
siseneda. Sellegipoolest ei saa sellist marsruudivalikut pidada üheselt riikliku õhusõiduki 




Riikliku õhusõiduki Eesti õhuruumi sisenemiseks loa saamiseks tuleb see taotleda 
Kaitseministeeriumilt. Antud protsess pole avalik ning taotleja saab ainult vastuse enda 
taotlusele. Euroopa Liidu ja NATO liikmesriikidele väljastatakse automaatselt aastased 
ülelennuload, mille alla kuuluvad enamikud nende riiklikud õhusõidukid. Eraldi luba on vaja 
taotleda juhtudel, mil riiklikul õhusõidukil on peal erivahendid, nt luuramiseks kasutatavad 
seadmed. Samuti on luba vaja taotleda diplomaatilist tähtsust omavatele lendudele, mida 
võidakse teostada kasutades nii riiklike või tsiviilõhusõidukeid. 
 
Kaitsevägi täidab enda ülesannet valvata ja kaitsta Eesti õhuruumi kasutades selleks enda 
struktuuriüksuseid, põhiliselt õhuväe koosseisu kuuluvat õhuseiredivisjoni, mille üheks 
põhieesmärgiks ongi Eesti õhuruumi puutumatuse tagamine. Õhuruumi kaitsmisel ei saa 
välistada õigust kasutada rikkuja vastu surmavat jõudu, kuid rahuaegses keskkonnas võib seda 
pidada ebaproportsionaalseks. Jõu kasutamine tsiviilõhusõidukite vastu on veelgi suurem 
tabu, kuid protseduurid tsiviilõhusõiduki vastu jõu kasutamiseks on paika pandud just nö 
Renegaat-õhusõiduki juhtumitel. Renegaat-õhusõidukiks peetakse tsiviilõhusõidukit, mida 
võidakse kasutada relvana, mille kontseptsioon sai alguse pärast New Yorgi kaksiktornide 
rünnakut. Õhuruumi valvamise üheks põhialuseks on pädev õhuseire, mille kaudu on 
tuvastatakse õhupiiri rikkuja kasutades Kaitseväe koosseisu kuuluvaid erinevaid õhuseire 
radareid. Õhuruumi üle seiret teostab õhuseiredivisjoni allüksus õhuoperatsioonide 
juhtimiskeskus, mis kuulub NATO laiemasse õhukaitse raamistikku. Lisaks Eesti 
sõjaväelistele struktuuriüksustele kasutatakse õhuruumi valvamiseks ja kaitsmiseks NATO 
Balti õhuturbe hävitajaid, mille põhieesmärgiks on huvipakkuvad õhusõiduki visuaalne 
tuvastamine ning vajadusel Eesti õhuruumist nö väljasurumine. Sellegipoolest tuleb arvestada, 
et tegemist pole Kaitseväe juhtimisstruktuuris olevate vahenditega ja nende kasutamine ning 
selle ulatus pannakse paika vastavalt NATO-sisestele protseduuride. 
 
Kõik viimase nelja aasta jooksul toimunud teadaolevad Eesti õhupiiri rikkumised on toimunud 
Vaindloo saare lähistel, mille põhipõhjuseks on asjaolu, et osa õhuruumist, mis on sealse 
territoriaalmere kohal ei kuulu Eesti lennujuhtimisealasse, vaid sealset liiklust juhivad 
Venemaa lennujuhid. Olukorrast väljumine tundub olema keeruline, kuigi vastavat õhuruumi 
korraldust on võimalik muuta, kuid see eeldab rahvusvahelist koostööd ja otsest kokkulepet 
nii Venemaa Föderatsiooni kui ka muude osapooltega. Piirkonnas on aastatel 2017 kuni 2021 
toimunud kolmteist Eesti õhupiiri rikkumist, kõik rikkumised on olnud lühiajalised, kuid see 




Soome õiguses on territoriaalsed rikkumised, sh õhupiiri rikkumised, kriminaliseeritud juba 
üle kahekümne aasta. Taolist rikkumist saavad toime panna ainult riiklikud õhusõidukid. 
Sellist kriminaliseerimist on peetud pigem sümboolseks, kuna aastate jooksul pole ühtegi 
õhupiiri rikkujate karistatud. Koosseisus peituvad mitmed väljakutsed kriminaalõigusele 
laiemalt. Territoriaalsete rikkumiste puhul on Soome prokuratuurile jäetud võrdlemisi vabad 
käed kriminaalmenetluse alustama jätmiseks või selle lõpetamiseks. Lisaks võidakse 
kriminaalmenetlus lõpetada kantuna menetlusökonoomikast, enamikel juhtudel pole võimalik 
rikkujat tuvastada, kuna isegi riigid, kellega Soomel on sõbralikud välissuhted, ei väljasta 
õhusõiduki pilootide identiteete. Rikkumine eeldab toimepanija poolt tahtluse olemasolu, 
mida võib olla keeruline tõendada, eriti kui on võimatu tuvastada toimepanija isikusamasust. 
Üleüldiselt peetakse antud koosseisu ekstraordinaarseks, rikkumised toimuvad regulaarselt, 
kuid kriminaalkorras karistada pole kedagi suudetud. Karistuste kartus ei heiduta antud 
rikkumiste toimumist, kuid annab sellegipoolest võimaluse probleemile laiemat kõlapinda 
pakkuda ning jätab lahti võimaluse lahendada arusaamatusi diplomaatiliste kanalite kaudu. 
 
Eesti õiguses pole õhupiiri rikkumised kriminaliseeritud, kuigi mitmed süüteod on seotud 
vähemalt mingi määrani ka õhupiiri ebaseadusliku ületamisega. Sellegipoolest ei ole üheselt 
rakendatavat koosseisu, mille alusel oleks võimalik rikkumiste toimepanijad vastutusele võtta. 
Ebaseadusliku piiriületamise kehtivad koosseisud on suunatud eelkõige maismaapiiri 
ületamise takistamise vastu, ning riigipiiri seaduses olevad koosseisud on väärteod. 
 
Võrdluses Soome õiguskorra ja sealt välja tulnud väljakutsetega õhupiiri rikkumiste 
kriminaliseerimisel, tuleb nentida, et Eesti kriminaalõiguses on sarnased murekohad. 
Kriminaalmenetluse läbiviimisel uuriti väljakutseid, mis seonduvad uurimisasutuste 
pädevusega, legaliteedi põhimõttega, tõendite kogumisega ning kriminaalmenetluse 
lõpetamisega erinevatel põhjustel. Sedastati, et kuigi õhuruumi valvamine ning kaitsmine on 
funktsioon, mida täidab Kaitsevägi, puudub sel pädevus taolisi kriminaalmenetlusi läbi viia, 
sest sõjaväepolitsei pädevuses on ainult konkreetsete õigusrikkumiste menetlemine. Tõendite 
kogumisel tuleb arvestada asjaoluga, et Kaitseväe poolt töödeldakse selliste rikkumiste 
avastamisel riigisaladust sisaldavaid andmeid. Kõige suuremaks probleemiks võib 
sellegipoolest kujuneda toimepanija tuvastamine, mille puhul on raske näha võimalust, et 
toimepanija päritolu riik taolist teavet Eesti uurimisasutustele väljastaks. Samuti võib pidada 
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väga tõenäoliseks, et kui rikkumiste puhul kriminaalmenetlust alustatakse, siis see lõpetatakse 
otstarbekuse kaalutlusel. Kõigest sellest järeldub, et kuigi toimepanijate karistamise tõenäosus 
on madal, ei saa tähelepanuta jätta kriminaalmenetluse alustamise võimalust, mille läbi saab 
juhtida probleemile suuremat tähelepanu. Karistusõiguslikult taandub väljakutse tahtluse ning 
õigusvastsuse küsimusele. Tahtluse kindlaks tegemine on sarnaselt Soome kogemusele 
märkimisväärselt keeruline, sest toimepanija isikut on peaaegu võimatu tuvastada. 
Õigusvastsust võib välistada toimepanija eksimus õigusvastasuste välistavas asjaolus ning 
sõjaväelises struktuuris käsu täitmine.  
 
Õhupiiri rikkumiste kriminaliseerimine ei lahenda üheselt olemasolevat probleemi. Arvestada 
tuleb kehtiva õiguskorrast tulenevat väljakutsetega ning asjaoluga, et Venemaa Föderatsioon 
on järjepidevalt taolisi rikkumisi eitanud. Kriminaliseerimine võrdluses Soome kogemusega 
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